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OVERPROTECTING THE CONSUMER? SECTION
2-607(3)(a) NOTICE OF BREACH IN
NONPRIVITY CONTEXTS
HARRY G. PRINCEt
Professor Prince examines the requirement of Uniform Commer-
cial Code section 2-607(3)(a) that a buyer give timely notice to a seller of
any breach in accepted goods that prove defective. In this Article, Pro-
fessor Prince argues that courts have overprotected the consumer by min-
imizing, and in some cases eliminating, the notice requirement of section
2-607(3)(a). The Article posits that courts have been especially prone to
eliminate notice in cases in which remote vendees or third party benefi-
ciaries have been injured by defective goods. Courts have thus been con-
cerned with protecting the consumer, but Professor Prince argues the
purposes and construction of section 2-607(3)(a) demonstrate the need to
ensure that a seller receive adequate notice of breach in accepted goods.
After a thorough analysis of judicial discussion and legislative treat-
ment of Code notice requirements, Professor Prince urges a "liberal but
proper" construction of section 2-607(3)(a), which would both protect
the unwary consumer and ensure that the seller receives timely notice of
an alleged breach.
Plaintiff argues that notification is unnecessary where the action
involves sale of goods for human consumption and that this require-
ment should only be applied in commercial transactions.
We reject plaintiff's construction of Section 2-607(3)(a) .... We
believe that the notification procedure is therefore proper if [a breach
of contract] theory of liability is advanced. To hold otherwise might
permit a defendant to be confronted with a stale claim thereby prevent-
ing the marshaling of evidence for a defense. It would also counte-
nance a selective disregard of various requirements set forth in the
Code based solely upon the nature of the action. If the Code is the
basis of recovery, a plaintiff will not be permitted to fulfill only certain
requirements while neglecting others.'
The plaintiff before the Illinois Supreme Court in Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.
presented a compelling case-a consumer brought an action for breach of con-
tract after suffering permanent, partial paralysis as a result of cerebral vascular
t Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. J.D. 1980, New
York University School of Law; B.A. 1977, Temple University. The author wishes to thank his
colleagues Ray D. Henson and David J. Jung for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft. The
author also wishes to acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by Bennett J. Fidlow
and Holli P. Thier, Hastings Class of 1988, and Rachel A. VanCleave, Hastings Class of 1989.
1. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 555-56, 309 N.E.2d 550, 554-55 (1974) (citations
omitted).
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accident or, more commonly, a stroke.2 The stroke allegedly resulted from the
purchase and ingestion of oral contraceptives manufactured and distributed by
codefendants G.D. Searle & Co. and Planned Parenthood of Chicago.3 Consid-
ering the relative circumstances of the parties, it is easily imaginable that the
compassion of the court would be with the injured consumer and that she would
therefore have the benefit of a sympathetic construction of the law. Nonetheless,
the consumer's argument for exemption from the notice requirement was re-
jected. The court stood fast on the general principle that an action brought
under the Uniform Commercial Code ("the Code") must be governed by all of
its relevant provisions, even if applying that principle meant the injured con-
sumer would be barred from any remedy because of failure to give the seller
notice of the breach as required by section 2-607(3)(a). 4
Section 2-607(3)(a) is addressed to situations in which a buyer keeps the
goods despite some nonconformity in the seller's tender but then elects to seek a
remedy for breach of contract.5 Notice is especially important in this situation
because the goods are kept by the buyer instead of being thrust back on the
seller, the latter of which occurs when the buyer either rejects the goods or re-
vokes an initial acceptance. 6 The seller very possibly would be unaware of an
alleged breach until provided notice. Section 2-607(3)(a) requires that the buyer
2. Id. at 550, 309 N.E.2d at 551-52.
3. Id.
4. The section reads: "(3) Where a tender has been accepted (a) the buyer must within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or
be barred from any remedy .... " U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1978).
5. The notice requirement applies to all breaches of contract, including a breach of warranty,
which is usually the more specific consumer claim. Clark, The First Line of Defense in Warranty
Suits: Failure to Give Notice of Breach, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 105, 110 (1982).
6. Generally speaking, and apart from the possibility of simply overlooking the defect, the
buyer has three options on the tender of nonconforming goods by a seller. The first option for the
buyer is to reject all or part of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-601. The buyer must make an effective
rejection under § 2-602, including the mandatory giving of notice as required by subsection (1). The
import of the requirements for effective rejection is that the buyer must refuse acceptance and thrust
the goods back on the seller, at least technically if not physically. See id. § 2-602 comment I ("A
tender or delivery of goods made pursuant to a contract of sale, even though wholly nonconforming,
requires affirmative action by the buyer to avoid acceptance."); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-1, at 293 (2d ed. 1980) ("Somewhat simplified, rejection is a combination of
the buyer's refusal to keep delivered goods and his notification to the seller that he will not keep
them."). For a thorough treatment of the mechanics of and limitations on rejection of nonconform-
ing goods, see R. HENSON, THE LAW OF SALES § 5.02 (1985); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra, § 8-
3.
A second option for the buyer who receives nonconforming goods is to accept and later revoke
the acceptance. This ability to reverse acceptance is an exceptional remedy and can be done only if
the restrictive provisions of § 2-608 can be satisfied, including the subsection (2) requirement that
notice be given to make a revocation of acceptance effective. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra,
§ 8-3 ("Since revocation of acceptance always occurs after acceptance and may occur long after the
seller regarded the transaction as closed, a buyer who might have rejected with ease must in theory
at least meet several additional conditions to revoke acceptance."). The essential purpose of a proper
and effective revocation of acceptance is to force the seller to retake nonconforming goods. See R.
NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 143 (1970).
The third option for the buyer in receipt of nonconforming goods is to decide to keep the goods
despite the nonconformity and then seek a remedy for the breach of the contract. It is only in this
third course of action that the buyer does not take action to force the goods back on the seller.
Although notice from consumers is required for both of the other courses of action without excep-
tion, it is particularly important in the third instance because the seller will not see the goods
returning.
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give notice within a reasonable period of time or be barred from any remedy.
The Berry court was unwilling to conjure up an exception to section 2-607(3)(a)
for certain consumer transactions7 as a minority of courts previously had done
under similar statutory provisions. 8 The Berry court was guided by the funda-
mental and essential principle that an action enjoying the relative advantages of
proceeding under the Code must also satisfy all the rigors of the Code.9
The Illinois courts have not faithfully adhered to the general dictate in
Berry that the whole of the Code, 10 including the section 2-607(3)(a) notice re-
quirement, should apply to cases brought thereunder. More particularly, some
Illinois appellate courts have concluded that notice of breach in cases of ac-
cepted goods should not be required from consumers who are not in privity with
the seller from whom they have sought a remedy. 1 The lack of privity in the
cases exists either because the consumer is a remote vendee pursuing an action
against a manufacturer or seller with whom there has not been a direct transac-
tion, or because the aggrieved consumer, rather than being a buyer of the goods,
is a third party beneficiary who uses, consumes, or otherwise is affected by the
7. It is clear that the text of § 2-607(3)(a) does not include an exception for consumer or
personal injury cases. See Bennett v. United Auto Parts, Inc., 294 Ala. 300, 303, 315 So. 2d 579, 581
(1975); R. HENSON, supra note 6, § 5.04(d), at 175-76; Clark, supra note 5, at 116. Similarly, the
predecessor § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act was not generally viewed as exempting consumer or
personal injury actions. See Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 103, 122 So. 2d 591,
592-93 (1960); James, Products Liability, 34 TEx. L. REV. 192, 196-97 (1955).
8. See Bennett v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150, 153-54 (E.D. Ill. 1964); Smith v.
Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 103-04, 122 So. 2d 591, 593 (1960); Kennedy v. F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 205 A.D. 648, 649-50, 200 N.Y.S. 121, 122 (1923); 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
THE LAW Or TORTS § 28.17, at 465 (2d ed. 1986).
9. Some courts have recognized the need to ensure that Code provisions are not selectively
applied. In Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 62 (M.D. Fla. 1982), the Fed-
eral District Court for the Middle District of Florida stated that "[t]o recognize an action against a
seller for breach of implied warranty not subject to the restrictions and limitations set forth in Arti-
cle 2 would substantially frustrate one of the fundamental purposes for which the U.C.C. was
adopted-to help simplify, clarify, and make uniform the law of commercial transactions." A simi-
lar view was expressed in an Oregon case: "In [a prior case] the majority of this court recognized the
existence of two separate remedies [for personal injuries], one, strict liability in tort, and the other,
implied warranty, provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. When the Uniform Commercial
Code remedy is sought it logically should be accompanied by both the benefits and the detriments
expressly provided by the statute." Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 285-86, 512 P.2d
776, 781 (1973) (Denecke, J., concurring); accord Parillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d 1313, 1317 (R.I.
1981); Smith v. Pizitz of Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 103-04, 122 So. 2d 591, 593 (1960); see also
Kaiser v. Hennis, No. CA-6832 (Ohio Ct. App. May 27, 1986) (Hoffman, J., dissenting) (LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file) ("Clearly, if a party wants to dance to the fast music of the UCC, he has to
'pay the piper' by observing the provision that affect [sic] him.").
10. Speculation might suggest that the court's steadiness resulted in part from defendants' fail-
ure to make an appropriate challenge to the propriety of the notice during the lower court proceed-
ings. Berry, 56 Ill. 2d at 556, 309 N.E.2d at 555. Because of the lack of objection the court found it
unnecessary to review the sufficiency of the notice, and the requirement of notice did not bar the
action by plaintiff in the case. Id. This observation, however, should not detract from the court's
emphatic statement that § 2-607(3)(a) would apply in consumer personal injury cases.
11. At least two Illinois cases subsequent to Berry have required that a buyer give notice to a
remote seller. See Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 964, 966, 382 N.E.2d 23, 25
(1978); Branden v. Gerbie, 62 I1. App. 3d 138, 140-41, 379 N.E.2d 7, 8-9 (1978). However, other
cases construing Illinois law have not required notice from consumers to remote sellers. See Owens
v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D. Ill. 1984); Malawy v. Richards Mfg. Co., 150 11.
App. 3d 549, 501 N.E.2d 376, 384 (1986), appeal denied, 108 Ill. Dec. 418, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987);
Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 347, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1978).
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relevant goods. 12 Other jurisdictions are also split on the applicability of the
section 2-607(3)(a) notice requirement to nonprivity consumers.13
The Illinois appellate courts could deviate because the objection to the lack
of notice in Berry was raised solely by defendant, Planned Parenthood Associa-
tion of Chicago.' 4 Planned Parenthood was the immediate seller in the case and
its objection did not squarely present the issue of whether notice to a remote
seller is required. The Berry court's concern with notice, however, appeared not
to be limited to the immediate seller. In resolving the issue the court's discus-
sion was phrased in response to the general assertion that personal injury cases
or consumer transactions should be exempt from the notice requirement. ' 5 The
court also noted that neither of the defendants had properly raised the issue of
notice.16 For support, the court cited cases which had required, at least tacitly,
that remote vendees give notice to nonprivity sellers.' 7
A review of the decisions that hold section 2-607(3)(a) notice is not required
from nonprivity consumers indicates selective application of the Code provision
is effectively occurring, despite the principle enunciated in Berry, through a con-
struction of the section so uneven that it nears disregard. The text of section 2-
607(3)(a) does not expressly address nonprivity consumers. Construing the sec-
tion, however, to exempt remote vendees and third party beneficiaries from the
notice requirement is starkly inconsistent with the recognized purposes and offi-
cial comments of the section. In addition, the exemption of nonprivity consum-
ers disrupts the symmetry in the rule and leads to a number of illogical and
unfair results. The courts that have exempted nonprivity consumers from com-
pliance with section 2-607(3)(a) have used rigid literalism in interpretation. The
same courts appear to be influenced by exaggerated perceptions of consumer
naivete and to confuse contract warranty and tort products liability causes of
action.
12. "Vertical privity," or the lack thereof, relates to the transactional relationship between par-
ties in a distributive chain-for example, the manufacturer, distributor, wholesaler, retailer, and the
end buyer. "Horizontal privity" addresses persons coming in contact with the goods after the ulti-
mate sale to the end buyer and typically includes the buyer's family members, guests, or employees
and occasionally includes strangers. "Double" or "diagonal" nonprivity refers to a combination of
vertical and horizontal nonprivity, as when a nonbuyer pursues an action against a remote seller.
See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 583-84, 489 A.2d 660, 674-75
(1985); W. HAWKI.AND, UCC SERIES § 2-318:01 (1984).
13. Jurisdictions with decisions requiring notice from remote vendees include Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Illinois, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. Jurisdictions with deci-
sions not requiring notice from remote vendees include Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Texas. Third party beneficiaries have been excused from giving notice by courts
construing law in Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Florida, and Maryland. See cases cited infra
notes 152-53.
14. Berry, 56 III. 2d at 556, 309 N.E.2d at 554.
15. Id. at 555-56, 309 N.E.2d at 554-55.
16. Id. at 556, 309 N.E.2d at 555.
17. Id. (citing Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273. 512 P.2d 776 (1973); San
Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 248 A.2d 778 (1968)). The courts in
Redfield and San Antonio appeared to assume that a buyer must give notice to a remote seller. See
Redfield, 266 Or. at 289, 512 P.2d at 781; San Antonio, 104 R.I. at 704-05, 248 A.2d at 780; see also
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 115, 452 A.2d 192, 197 (1982) (reading
Redfield and San Antonio to require notice), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983).
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Nevertheless, the position that section 2-607(3)(a) does not apply to non-
privity consumers has gained an alarming degree of acceptance by the courts.
This trend portends a substantial effect because the notice requirement has been
at issue in significant consumer-oriented litigation. The consumer cases include
not only oral contraceptive cases,' 8 such as Berry, but also other actions involv-
ing health-threatening products such as asbestos liability cases' 9 and litigation
over the Dalkon Shield and other intrauterine birth control devices (IUDs).20
Disputes concerning section 2-607(3)(a) notice also have been raised in a large
number of actions for breach of warranty in sales of automobiles, 2' mobile
homes,22 and other major consumer goods, 23 as well as for breach of contract in
the purchase of a wide variety of consumer goods.
24
The primary thesis of this Article is that many courts have gone too far in
their efforts to protect the consumer in litigation against merchants by improp-
erly construing section 2-607(3)(a) to eliminate the requirement of notice in non-
privity cases. The comments to section 2-607(3)(a) leave little doubt that courts
should treat the consumer more liberally than the merchant in assessing compli-
18. See Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978); Fischer v.
Mead-Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1973); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson &
Co., 266 Or. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973).
19. See Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Colo. 1986);
Hooksett School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.H. 1984); see also Graham v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987) (alleged breach of warranty when child
suffered brain damage after receiving vaccination); Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509 (Ala.
1979) (silicosis allegedly resulting from defective sandblasting hood); Malawy v. Richards Mfg. Co.,
150 Ill. App. 3d 549, 501 N.E.2d 376 (1986) (defective bone plate inserted during surgery), appeal
denied, 108 Il1. Dec. 418, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987).
20. See, e.g., Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Hawkinson v.
A.H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290 (D. Colo. 1984); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187
(Colo. 1984) (en banc); Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 964, 382 N.E.2d 23 (1978);
Branden v. Gerbie, 62 Ill. App. 3d 138, 379 N.E.2d 7 (1978); Coody v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 S.W.2d
154 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985). For a history of the Dalkon Shield and resulting litigation which had led
the A.H. Robins Company into Chapter 11 reorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, see
Hawkinson, 595 F. Supp. at 1295-1306; Courie, The A.H. Robins Saga, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 56.
21. See, e.g., Begley v. Jeep Corp., 491 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Va. 1980); American Honda Motor
Co. v. Boyd, 475 So. 2d 835 (Ala. 1985); Smart Chevrolet Co. v. Davis, 262 Ark. 500, 558 S.W.2d
147 (1977) (en banc) (sale of automobile); Burns v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 97 A.D.2d 977,
468 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1983).
22. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976); Vintage Homes,
Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502
S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
23. See, e.g., Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (sale of
motorcycle); Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (sale of houseboat),
aff'd, 574 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1978); Parzek v. New England Log Homes, Inc., 92 A.D.2d 954, 460
N.Y.S.2d 698 (1983) (log home building kit); Carlson v. Rysavy, 262 N.W.2d 27 (S.D. 1978)
(purchase of modular home).
24. Other types of consumer cases concerning § 2-607(3)(a) notice include purchases of food-
stuffs, Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 194 S.E.2d 13 (1972) (suit based
on sale of soda); Nugent v. Popular Mkts., Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 228 N.E.2d 91 (1967) (food allegedly
containing splinters); San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 248 A.2d 778
(1968) (defective bottle of soda); other home products, Towe v. Justis Bros., Inc., 290 A.2d 657 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1972) (defective refrigerator); Leeper v. Banks, 487 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (defec-
tive starch); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981) (defective flash
cubes); Agway, Inc. v. Teitscheid, 144 Vt. 76, 472 A.2d 1250 (1984) (defective carpet); and a burial
casket, Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), writ of error
denied, 701 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1986).
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ance with the section,2 5 but some courts have gone beyond liberal construction
to the point of distortion. The distortion of the section is improper because it
steals from the merchant significant protection that the Code, as finally drafted
and generally enacted into law,2 6 provides in disputes over breach in accepted
goods. Moreover, the distortion arguably is unnecessary because a properly flex-
ible construction of section 2-607(3)(a) provides all of the liberality with regard
to giving notice that the consumer fairly needs without taking from the
merchant the basic right to have reasonable notice of an alleged breach in ac-
cepted goods.
Part I of this Article includes a brief discussion of the origin and purposes
of section 2-607(3)(a). The focus then turns to a more detailed study of the gen-
eral construction of the section. Part II of the Article addresses the nonprivity
situations in which consumers27 are very likely to be involved: cases in which
the remote vendee seeks a remedy from a manufacturer or seller, and cases in
which the consumer seeking relief is a third party beneficiary rather than a
buyer. These two situations present circumstances lacking a direct transaction
between the consumer and the seller whom he seeks to hold liable for breach of
contract. These situations, therefore, raise the essential question whether notice
of breach ought to be required from the consumer in nonprivity cases.
I. ORIGIN, PURPOSES, AND CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 2-607(3)(a)
During this century the courts have uniformly moved toward increasing
manufacturer or seller liability to consumers, which have included remote vend-
ees and third party beneficiaries. 28 While much attention has been focused on
attempts to limit some of the advantages widely given to the consumer in the
25. For relevant text ofU.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) comment 4, see infra text accompanying note 108.
Courts have gone beyond the grant of more liberal time to the consumer, as advocated in comment
4, to accept the broader concept that the standards for sufficiency of notice for consumers is less
rigorous than for merchants. See Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 462 (Alaska 1983); Pace v.
Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 274, 560 P.2d 789, 792 (1977); Industrial Fiberglass v. Jandt,
361 N.W.2d 595, 597-98 (N.D. 1985). Courts were previously inclined to apply a more liberal stan-
dard to consumers under the Uniform Sales Act § 49. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers To-
bacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298 n.16 (3d Cir. 1961).
26. A review of the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service State Correlation Tables
reveals that only three states have legislation that modifies the text or effect of § 2-607(3)(a). U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) Correlation Tables (1987). Maine and South Carolina have specifically al-
tered the reading of § 2-607. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-607 (1973); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-607 (Law. Co-op. 1966). Massachusetts has limited the effect of § 2-607(3)(a) through its
formulation of § 2-318. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1974). The law in these
states is discussed in more detail infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
27. Somewhat surprisingly, relatively few cases raise the issue of notice to be given by a remote
merchant buyer to a manufacturer or seller. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98
N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985). Why cases of that type are scarce is not apparent. In contrast, the
prevalent structure of the § 2-318 provisions extends third party warranty coverage to natural per-
sons and thus minimizes the possibility of merchant buyers having third party beneficiary standing
under the UCC. Nonetheless, most principles advocated in this Article as being applicable to remote
buyers or third party beneficiaries should be equally applicable to merchants who happen to come
within one of those categories.
28. See James, supra note 7, at 192; Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law,
96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1534 (1987). But cf McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Inplications, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 3, 3-22 (1970) (outlining changes in law affecting manufacturer liability but question-
ing whether shift has been truly "dramatic").
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area of tort products liability,2 9 there is also room to question whether the
courts have gone too far in the area of warranty liability in contract. The major
movement in the area of contract liability has been the elimination of privity as a
requirement for the bringing of an action against a seller. 30 On elimination of
the privity requirement, significant issues have emerged concerning the defenses
a seller might have in an action by a nonprivity consumer. These issues include
the manner in which express or implied warranties might be created in the non-
privity context, the proper application of statutory limitations periods, the
seller's ability to disclaim or exclude warranties, and the application of the no-
tice requirement to nonprivity cases. 3 1 Some of these issues pose particularly
difficult problems and remain unresolved by the courts. The requirement of no-
tice of breach, however, is one of the defenses that requires and readily lends
itself to resolution by the courts.
The applicability of section 2-607(3)(a) to nonprivity cases is overshadowed
by the many cases that involve consumers with personal injuries in litigation
against manufacturers or sellers with substantial wealth. In this context courts
appear to bypass or ignore normal rules of statutory construction. A review of
the relevant cases suggests the courts have overreacted to the well-worn idea
that the consumer suffers from naivete and, therefore, is enormously over-
matched in attempting to obtain a remedy from a merchant manufacturer or
seller.3 2 A tendency to distort section 2-607(3)(a) is further complicated by the
disinclination of many courts to allow for the possibility that initiation of a law-
suit itself may be an appropriate means of giving notice.33 However, the courts
might be less inclined to eliminate the notice requirement if initiation of a law-
suit could possibly constitute notice. The immediate result of these and other
difficulties is that the notice requirement has eroded; more generally, as one ju-
rist has suggested, the consumer plaintiff now has the clear advantage in per-
sonal injury cases. 34 It is doubtful that the advantage granted to the consumer
29. See, eg., Dworkin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 602 (1983);
Phillips, To Be Or Not To Be: Reflections on Changing Our Tort System, 46 MD. L. REV. 55 (1986);
Phillips, In Defense of the Tort System, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 603 (1985). Of course, overlap exists in
cases that involve both tort products liability and contract warranty liability. And although some
courts have confused the two separate causes of action, the two theories of recovery do have different
elements and distinguishable underlying principles. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 98 N.J. 555, 569-70, 579-81, 489 A.2d 660, 667-68, 672-73 (1985). For a detailed discussion of
the overlap and distinctions, see infra notes 211-26 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
31. Traditionally, the defenses a seller might have in an action for breach of contract in general
or breach of warranty in particular would include: (1) lack of privity; (2) preclusion of limitation of
warranty through disclaimer; (3) exculpating acts by the plaintiff such as contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, or misuse; (4) statute of limitations; and (5) failure to give notice of an alleged
breach. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 518 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1976); Spring Motors
Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 569-70, 489 A.2d 660, 677 (1985); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 6, §§ I1-1 to -10.
32. See infra notes 184-210 & 284-92 and accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 116-37.
34. According to one judge,
It seems to us that in the never ending process of adjusting settled rules of law to changing
conditions in society the courts have taken seven league boot strides toward equalizing the
positions of injured plaintiffs, manufacturers, distributors and retailers. Within the "dis-
tributive chain" the relative positions have not only been equalized, as was long overdue,
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in contract from the negation of the section 2-607(3)(a) notice requirement is fair
or warranted.
A. Origin and Purposes of Section 2-607(3)(a)
The origin of the notice provision of section 2-607(3)(a) is well-docu-
mented35 and requires only brief repetition. The genesis of the section is found
in an older common-law rule, prevalent in some jurisdictions, that acceptance of
goods by a buyer would waive any claim he might have for breach by the
seller.36 Under this rule the options for the buyer were to reject the goods and
sue for breach or to accept the defective tender of goods and thereby waive any
claim for breach. 37 If a buyer found himself in desperate need of the goods, then
he would have to accept them and forego any remedy for breach.3 8
Some courts eventually created an exception in favor of the buyer by al-
lowing the buyer to accept the goods but preserve any claim he might have for
breach by giving notice of the breach to the seller.3 9 This approach gained a
wider acceptance on its inclusion in section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act.40
Although section 49 was applied with difficulty to consumer cases,4 ' the rela-
but the advantage, if any now exists, has shifted to the injured plaintiff. In Michigan he
may proceed in warranty or tort (despite some rather paradoxical language in [a prior
case].) In warranty, courts responded to the "ever-growing pressure for protection of the
consumer, coupled with a realization that liability would not unduly inhibit the enterprise
of manufacturers and that they were well placed both to profit from its lessons and to
distribute its burdens."
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 92-93, 133 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1965) (O'Hara, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 241, 109 N.W.2d
918, 921 (1961)).
35. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 971-73 (5th Cir.
1981); Metro Inv. Corp. v. Portland Road Lumber Yard, Inc., 263 Or. 76, 78-80, 501 P.2d 312, 314(1972); W. HAWKLAND, supra note 12, § 2-607:07, at 66-70; L. VOLD, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
SALES 460-62 (2d ed. 1959).
36. See Eastern, 532 F.2d at 971; Whitfield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 828, 193 P.2d 1, 2 (1948)
Metro Inv. Corp., 263 Or. at 79, 501 P.2d at 314; L. VOLD, supra note 35, at 460.
37. See Metro Inv. Corp., 263 Or. at 79, 501 P.2d at 314; James, supra note 7, at 197.
38. See Metro Inv. Corp., 263 Or. at 79, 501 P.2d at 314; L. VOLD, supra note 35, at 460.
39. See Eastern, 532 F.2d at 971; Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores Inc., 58 N.H. 409, 412, 190 A.
280, 282 (1937); Metro Inv. Corp., 263 Or. at 79-80, 501 P.2d at 314; L. VOLD, supra note 35, at 460-
61.
40. See Metro Inv. Corp., 263 Or. at 79-80, 501 P.2d at 314; W. HAWKLAND, supra note 12,
§ 2-607:07, at 66-70. Section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act read:
In the absence of express or implied agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods
by the buyer shall not discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy
for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But, if, after
acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail [sic] to give notice to the seller of the breach of any
promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of
such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor.
UNIF. SALES ACT § 49 (1906).
41. See 3 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 22-11, at 301 (4th ed. 1974). A statement of
the popular construction of the § 49 notice requirement can be found in Salmon Rivers Sportsman
Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Air Co., 97 Idaho 348, 355, 544 P.2d 306, 313 (1975) (quoting Barni v.
Kutner, 45 Del. 550, 76 A.2d 801 (Super. Ct. 1950)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mitchell
Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984):
It must (1) refer to particular sales, so far as practicable; (2) fairly advise the seller of the
alleged defects; (3) repel the inference of waiver; (4) assert, directly or by reasonable infer-
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tively vibrant requirement of privity at the time largely prevented the problems
consumers have faced under section 2-607(3)(a). 42
The provisions of section 2-607(3)(a) borrow heavily from those of section
49,43 but liberalize the notice requirement and move away from courts' unduly
technical constructions of section 49.4 Despite this general liberalization, the
erosion of the privity requirement contributes more to the current difficulties in
interpreting section 2-607(3)(a) than do any textual differences from section 49.
A more general goal served by the notice requirement of section 2-
607(3)(a), suggested by its origins, is the balancing of the buyer's interest in
having an action for defects in accepted goods with the seller's interest in having
the books closed on a transaction unless the buyer objects within a reasonable
period of time.45 In addition to this general goal of fairness, courts have consist-
ently identified three more specific purposes served by the notice requirement
ence, that the buyer is claiming a violation of his legal rights, although it need not take the
form of an express claim for damages or threat of such.
See also Adler v. United States, 270 F.2d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 1959) (citing cases); Carlson v. Rysavy,
262 N.W.2d 27, 30 n.1 (S.D. 1978) (notice under the Uniform Sales Act "'must refer to particular
sales,... must at least fairly advise the seller of the alleged defects; and.., must be such as to repel
the inference of waiver.' ") (quoting Gilger v. Montgomery Lumber Co., 73 S.D. 599, 47 N.W.2d
281 (1951)).
42. The assault on privity as a requirement for pursuit of a cause of action against a seller began
as early as 1916 in the case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916),
but picked up significant momentum in more recent years. See 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
supra note 8, § 28.16; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
43. See Eastern, 532 F.2d at 972; Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298
n.16 (3d Cir. 1961); 3 S. WILLIsTON, supra note 41, § 22-11, at 297.
44. Courts occasionally construed § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act to require a buyer's express
notice of intent to seek legal redress for specified damages. See Eastern, 532 F.2d at 976; Paulson v.
Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 522-23, 319 N.W.2d 855, 861-62 (1982); L. VOLD, supra
note 35, at 461-62. Concern over this exacting construction was reflected in comment 4 to § 2-607,
which provides:
The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a
merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notification from a retail consumer is to be
judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring
notification is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith con-
sumer of his remedy.
The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the
transaction is still troublesome and must be watched. There is no reason to require that the
notification which saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a clear statement
of all the objections that will be relied on by the buyer, as under the section covering
statements of defects upon rejection (Section 2-605). Nor is there reason for requiring the
notification to be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or other resort to a
remedy. The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only be
such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus
opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation.
U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4.
45. In Courtesy Enters. v. Richards Laboratories, 457 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), the
court noted:
What runs throughout all these considerations is the seller's right to rely upon the finality
of a transaction after the elapse of a particular period of time. The buyer is not barred
from asserting a breach if he does so before the seller may reasonably expect that the
transaction has ceased to be problematic. UCC Section 2-607, Comment 4. The premise is
balancing fairness to the buyer, who may encounter defective merchandise, with fairness to
the seller, who is entitled to rely upon conclusiveness of a sale at some point.
Id. at 577.
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that benefit the seller in particular.4 6 First, notice gives the seller an opportunity
to correct a defect or otherwise minimize damages. Second, if correction is not
forthcoming or achievable, notice gives the seller an opportunity to negotiate a
settlement or prepare for litigation by investigating the facts while still fresh.
Third, the requirement of timely notice offers more general protection against
stale claims. Some courts have also noted that the seller may benefit from notice
by avoiding delivery of defective goods to other buyers47 or by asserting a
timely claim against a third party from whom the defective goods may have been
purchased. 48
These widely recognized purposes refute any suggestion that the require-
ment of notice of breach in accepted goods is a mere technicality; the seller
actually does benefit from receiving notice. The importance of section 2-
607(3)(a) to the seller should be underscored, because many courts have deval-
ued its purposes when considering whether notice ought to be required from
nonprivity consumers. These courts have then proceeded to adopt an overly
restrictive, literal reading of the section, despite the instances of actual or poten-
tial prejudice that can be found in a number of consumer and commercial
cases.4 9 Professors White and Summers offer as an example the case of Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,50 by stating that "the Henningsens notified
Chrysler so late in their famous case that Chrysler was not even able to find and
inspect the automobile in which Mrs. Henningsen was injured."51 Although no-
46. See, e.g., Eastern, 532 F.2d at 972-73; Agristor Leasing v. A.0. Smith Corp., 634 F. Supp.
1208, 1221 (D. Kan. 1986); Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Ala. 1983); Hepper v.
Triple U Enters., Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525, 527 (S.D. 1986); Petro-Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co.,
686 P.2d 589, 591 (Wyo. 1984); see also Dowdle v. Young, 1 Ariz. App. 255, 256, 401 P.2d 740, 741
(1965) (same purposes served by notice provisions of Unif. Sales Act § 49).
47. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648,
652 (1974); Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 614, 615
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 13, 1978); Hepper v. Triple U Enters., Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525, 527 (SD.
1986).
48. Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1983).
49. See, e.g., Smith-Moore Body Co. v. Heil Co., 603 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Va. 1985) (notice
coming four years after initial injury and seven months after plaintiff learned of defendant's involve-
ment effectively prevented timely investigation, negotiation, settlement, and timely deposition of wit-
nesses); Begley v. Jeep Corp., 491 F. Supp. 63, 66 (W.D. Va. 1980) (notice coming two and one half
years after learning of alleged defect arguably prevented timely investigation, negotiation, settlement,
and timely deposition of witnesses); Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101-03 (Ala. 1983) (court
persuaded that failure to give notice of defects in truck pre-empted possibility of repair and minimi-
zation of loss); White v. Mississippi Order Buyers, Inc., 648 P.2d 682, 684 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)
(with defect in perishable items-livestock-failure to give notice until after the livestock had died or
been resold pre-empted investigation of facts relevant to alleged breach, attempts to cure, and negoti-
ation of resolution); Courtesy Enters., Inc. v. Richards Laboratories, 457 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983) (lack of prompt notice led to further deterioration of defective goods and increase in loss);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 452 A.2d 192 (1982) (in accident caused
by automobile tire blowout, lack of notice to remote manufacturer resulted in having no chance to
inspect evidence), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 430 (1983); Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134,138
(S.D. 1983) (lack of prompt notice precluded minimization of damages and effective investigation of
facts, and made difficult possible action against seller's seller); Carroll Instrument Co. v. B.W.B.
Controls, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 654, 657-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (alleged lack of notice prevented seller
from pursuing claim against his own seller).
50. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
51. J. WHITE R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 11-10, at 422.
1987] NOTICE OF BREACH TO NONPRIVITY SELLERS 117
tice is not required in strict liability tort cases, 52 and perhaps for good reason, 53
it is equally clear that the Uniform Commercial Code seeks to avoid the preju-
dice to the seller by requiring a buyer's prompt notice of an alleged breach.
In addition to the other purposes served by the section 2-607(3)(a) notice
requirement, the requirement may assist the promotion of dispute resolution
outside the judicial process. Because the backlog of cases in both federal and
state courts now stands at alarming rates, 54 judges should be particularly recep-
tive to enforcing Code provisions that might promote settlement or early termi-
nation of lawsuits.
55
B. Construction of Section 2-607(3)(a) Notice Requirement
Prior discussions of section 2-607(3)(a) have identified several aspects of
construction that courts have addressed in applying the notice requirement.5 6
The general construction issues include (1) the form of notice; (2) to whom no-
tice should be given; (3) the content of notice; (4) the effect of actual knowledge
of the breach by the seller; (5) the timing of notice; (6) the effect of a lack of
prejudice from failure to give notice; and (7) whether the initiation of a lawsuit
may serve as notice. The following discussion is directed toward the general
problems which arise in applying section 2-607(3)(a) in the context of nonprivity
consumer cases.
1. The Form of Notice
Courts and commentators have almost uniformly agreed that the form of
notice under section 2-607(3)(a) may be either written or oral.57 Although the
idea has been advanced that notice coming from merchants, as opposed to con-
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
53. Courts and commentators have offered the theory that the general absence of a notice re-
quirement in tort is attributable to historical developments. Historically, the tortfeasor was likely to
be present at the time the tort occurred and therefore notice was not required. See Smith v. Pizitz of
Bessemer, Inc., 271 Ala. 101, 103-04, 122 So. 2d 591, 593 (1960); Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales
and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Difference?, 47 IND. L.J. 457, 462 (1971). In
addition, it is likely that the shorter statutes of limitation in tort causes of action, typically one or
two years, prevent the issue of staleness from arising. One would be hard pressed, however, to assert
that early notice in tort actions would not yield the same benefit to defendants as in contract actions.
See J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.25 (1977).
54. For recent discussions of apparent state and federal court case backlogs, see Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986), and comments thereon, Dobbs, Can
You Care for the People and Still Count the Costs?, 46 MD. L. REv. 49 (1986); Saks, If There Be a
Crisis, How Shall We Know It, 46 MD. L. REV. 63 (1986); Priest, supra note 28; Samuelson, The
Litigation Explosion: The Wrong Question, 46 MD. L. REV. 78 (1986); Marvell & Daniels, Are
Caseloads Really Increasing?, 25 JUDGE'S J. 34 (1986).
55. Evidence exists that manufacturers and sellers are often responsive in settlement when
presented with a consumer complaint. See Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer
Products Warranty Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1405, 1453-54.
56. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 105; Dillsaver, Notice of Breach After Acceptance of Tender,
17 U.C.C. L.J. 220 (1985).
57. See, e.g., Barrington Corp. v. Patrick Lumber Co., 447 So. 2d 785, 789 (Ala. Civ. App.
1984); Oden & Simes Used Cars, Inc. v. Thurman, 65 Ga. App. 500, 500-01, 301 S.E.2d 673, 674
(1983); Dowling v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc., 237 Kan. 536, 544, 701 P.2d 954, 960 (1985);
Clark, supra note 5, at 118-19.
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sumers, should be written rather than oral,58 that position has not gained any
measurable following. Common sense would suggest that oral notice is likely to
be more difficult to prove than written notice; 59 but if the oral notice can be
proven, then it should be just as effective as written notice. Notice may come in
one or several communications, 60 and with regard to consumers courts have
shown great flexibility in determining what conduct may constitute acceptable
notice. In Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co.61 the Colorado Supreme Court concluded
that a physician who had sold an IUD to a patient had been given notice when
the patient presented herself to the physician in a life-threatening condition. 62
2. To Whom Notice Should Be Given
The text of section 2-607(3)(a) states simply that notice is to be given to
"the seller." The complication likely to arise is that notice may be given to a
third party other than the seller who is being sued, either because of a close
relationship between the seller and the third party or with the intent that the
third party will inform the correct seller of any difficulties with the goods. In
this connection two related factors may have particular relevance to the con-
sumer cases. First, in construing section 2-607(3)(a) courts have utilized section
1-201(26) of the Code, which provides:
A person "notifies" or "gives" a notice or notification to another
by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other
in ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know
of it. A person "receives" a notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or
(b) it is duly delivered at the place of business through which the
contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the place
for receipt of such communications. 63
In light of section 1-201(26), courts have read section 2-607(3)(a) to require only
that reasonable steps be taken to cause notice to reach the appropriate seller. If
those steps are taken, the courts have concluded it does not matter whether the
seller actually receives the buyer's notice. 64 Under this reasoning, circumstances
58. See VLN Corp. v. American Office Equip. Co., 536 P.2d 863, 867 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975);
Badger Produce Co. v. Prelude Foods Int'l, 130 Wis. 2d 230, 245, 387 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Ct. App.
1986).
59. See Hoffman's Double Bar Pine Nursery v. Fyke, 633 P.2d 516, 518-19 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981); Clark, supra note 5, at 118-19.
60. T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of Flour, 629 F.2d 338, 359 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g
denied sub nom. ADM Milling Co. v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 651 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1981); Petro-
Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 686 P.2d 589, 591 (Wyo. 1984).
61. 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
62. Id. at 206-07; see also Malawy v. Richards Mfg. Co., 150 III. App. 3d 549, 501 N.E.2d 376
(1986) (hospital that had sold bone plate to patient had notice of breach when its employees observed
removal of the defective plate during surgery), appeal denied, 114 III. 2d 547, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987).
63. U.C.C. § 1-201(26).
64. See, e.g., Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 1313 (D. Colo. 1984); Barring-
ton Corp. v. Patrick Lumber Co., 447 So. 2d 785, 788 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984); Pruteh v. Ford Motor
Co., 618 P.2d 657, 661 (Colo. 1980) (when notice through dealer actually reached remote manufac-
turer there was no need for additional direct or formal notice); Carroll Instrument Co. v. B.W.B.
Controls, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); cf. American Honda Motor Co. v. Boyd,
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may arise in which the immediate seller is an appropriate conduit through which
a buyer might convey reasonable notice to a remote seller.
A second and related point is that an immediate seller in some cases may be
considered an agent for a remote seller, so that notice to the agent will be effec-
tive as to the remote seller. An example of this relationship is found in Moun-
tain-Aire Refrigeration v. General Electric Co.,65 in which the Arizona Supreme
Court found that a sales and service franchisee had effectively been authorized
to act as agent for the remote manufacturer-franchisor for the purpose of receiv-
ing notice of breach. 66 The net effect of these two factors is that notice given by
an aggrieved buyer to an immediate seller-particularly in consumer cases in
which liberal standards are applied-may be considered effective notice to the
remote seller, provided the immediate seller can be legitimately designated as
either agent for the remote seller or the appropriate conduit for dispatching no-
tice to the remote seller.
3. The Content of the Notice
A clear consensus exists that section 2-607(3)(a) establishes a more liberal
standard for the content of notice than had previously existed under section 49
of the Uniform Sales Act. Courts have disagreed, however, over just how far the
liberalization properly should go. There is little doubt that notice must suffi-
ciently identify the transaction or goods for which a breach is being claimed, 67
but courts have differed on whether the notice must go beyond a statement of
dissatisfaction to include an express allegation of breach or assertion of a legal
right.6 8 The difference of opinion over the construction of section 2-607(3)(a)
475 So. 2d 835, 839 (Ala. 1985) (notice was effective when actually passed on to manufacturer by
dealer).
65. 146 Ariz. 30, 703 P.2d 577 (1985).
66. Id. at 33, 703 P.2d at 580; accord Hinchcliffe v. American Motor Corp., 184 Conn. 607,
621-22, 440 A.2d 810, 817 (1981) (bringing car into dealer for repairs was sufficient notice for dealer
and manufacturer); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 63-64, 433 A.2d 801, 810-11
(1981) (court interpreted warranty provisions providing that service problems related to the manu-
facturer's warranty should be referred to the local dealership as establishing the dealer as agent for
the manufacturer for the purpose of receiving notice of an alleged breach of the contract's warranty
provisions). Contra Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D. 1983) (livestock auctioneer was
seller's agent for purpose of selling property but not for purpose of receiving notice of breach).
67. In Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 327 A.2d 502 (1974), the court stated:
Where there has been more than one transaction between the parties some identifica-
tion of the particular sale or transaction as to which the complaint is made by the buyer
must be contained in the notice or the notice would fail its essential purpose because the
seller then would not understand to what the notice referred.
Id. at 13, 327 A.2d at 511; see also Ford v. Barnard, Sumner & Putnam Co., I Mass. App. Ct. 192,
194-95, 294 N.E.2d 467, 469 (1973) (notice was ineffective when buyer called defendant seller with
complaint of defect in goods but did not identify herself).
68. Although some courts seem to raise the possibility that a "claim for damages" might also be
required, the prevailing view is that a claim for damages was frequently a requirement under § 49 of
the Uniform Sales Act, but is not required by § 2-607(3)(a). See, eg., Paulson v. Olson Implement
Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 523, 319 N.W.2d 855, 861-62 (1982) (identifying claim for damages as part of
Uniform Sales Act § 49 not included in § 2-607(3)(a) notice); Petro-Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co., 686 P.2d 589, 591-92 (Wyo. 1984) (holding "clearly erroneous" jury instructions requiring
notice to state "that the buyer looks to the seller for damages"); see also U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4
(1978) ("Nor is there reason for requiring the notification to be a claim for damages or of any
threatened litigation or other resort to a remedy.-).
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results more from overly broad generalizations about the section and its com-
ments than from any actual conflict within the section.
Those taking divergent viewpoints on the content of notice have usually
chosen to emphasize different aspects of comment 4 to section 2-607. Illustra-
tions of the opposing positions appear in the White and Summers treatise on the
Uniform Commercial Code69 and the prominent section 2-607(3)(a) case of
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.70
The White and Summers treatise states that the standard for the content of
notice under section 2-607(3)(a) is so extremely liberal that a buyer merely needs
to indicate a transaction is troublesome, and for that purpose "a scribbled note
on a bit of toilet paper will do."'71 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held differently in deciding the Eastern case. The Eastern court
essentially took the position that the notice must indicate not only that the buyer
is dissatisfied with the transaction, but also that the transaction is claimed to
involve a breach of the contract. 72
As some courts have recently suggested, however, both White and Sum-
mers and Eastern go too far in their respective positions when read as establish-
ing general standards for the content of notice.7 3 The White and Summers
construction of a liberal standard for the content of notice is based in the part of
comment 4 to section 2-607 that states the notice merely needs to be such as "to
let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched."' 74 Comment 4 goes on to state, however, that the notice must be such
that it "informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and
thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation."75' This latter
portion of the comment was emphasized by the Eastern court in arriving at an
apparently more demanding construction of section 2-607(3)(a). 76 Although it
indicated consumers might be held to a less demanding test than merchants, 77
69. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6.
70. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976).
71. White and Summers state:
Finally, what constitutes sufficient notice under 2-607(3)(a)? How explicit must it be?
May it be oral? Must it threaten litigation? Quite clearly the drafters intended a loose test;
a scribbled note on a bit of toilet paper will do .... Under [comment 4], it is difficult to
conceive of words which if put in writing, would not satisfy the notice requirement of 2-
607. Indeed, a letter containing anything but the most exaggerated encomiums would
seem to tell that the transaction "is still troublesome and must be watched."
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 11-10, at 425; see also City Welding & Mfg. Co. v. Gidley-
Eschenheimer Corp., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373-74, 451 N.E.2d 734, 735-36 (1983) (complaints of
defects enough even if unaccompanied by express assertion of legal rights); Hepper v. Triple U
Enters., Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525, 527 n.4 (S.D. 1986) (notice need not include buyer's intention to look
to seller for damages); Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979)
(general statement of dissatisfaction is sufficient notice).
72. Eastern, 532 F.2d at 978. The Eastern Court stated, "The buyer's conduct, then, taken as a
whole must constitute timely notification that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach." Id.
73. See Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 408-09 n.3 (Sth Cir.
1985); Speakman Co. v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 277 nn.3 & 4 (D. Del. 1984).
74. See supra note 71. For the full text of comment 4 see supra note 44.
75. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) comment 4. For the full text of comment 4 see supra note 44.
76. Eastern, 532 F.2d at 976-78.
77. Id. at 977.
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the Eastern court rejected the idea that the general standard for adequate notice
under section 2-607(3)(a) would be a minimal standard, such as that advocated
by White and Summers.7 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently ob-
served that the drafters of the official comments should be presumed not to have
intended to establish conflicting standards for the construction of section 2-
607(3)(a). Therefore, the two interpretive statements within comment 4 should
be harmonized to construct a consistent guideline.7 9 The court went on to sug-
gest that in harmonizing the potentially conflicting statements, courts should be
mindful that the notice be sufficient to serve all the recognized purposes of sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a), 80 including the need to let the seller know that she needs to
investigate the events concerning the alleged breach so as to be able to answer a
potential lawsuit. Viewed in light of the need to serve the underlying purposes
of section 2-607(3)(a), it is not surprising that in some circumstances a note of
dissatisfaction on a piece of toilet paper will be sufficient, but in other contexts
such informal notice will not sufficiently apprise the seller that she must answer
a claim for breach.
An example of the type of case in which informal statements of dissatisfac-
tion would be sufficient is Melody Home Manufacturing Co. v. Mforrison.81 In
that case a consumer purchaser of a mobile home made repeated complaints
about a severe defect in the home's water system and other problems.8 2 In the
context of a one-time purchase of great significance for the consumer, the seller
should have been sufficiently alerted by the complaints that not only was the
transaction troublesome and in need of continued vigilance, but also the con-
sumer was very likely to seek some remedy for breach if the problems remained
unresolved.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin emphasized the importance of the context
in assessing the effectiveness of notice in Paulson v. Olson Implement Co.83
Although the court decided that Wisconsin law did not require that an express
claim for damages be included in the notice, it cited examples of prior cases in
which the facts warranted a greater or lesser allegation of breach in the notice.
The examples included a case in which the buyer called the seller long distance
78. The Eastern court wrote:
However, the fact that the Code has eliminated the technical rigors of the notice re-
quirement under the Uniform Sales Act does not require the conclusion that any expres-
sion of discontent by a buyer always satisfies section 2-607. As Comment 4 indicates, a
buyer's conduct under section 2-607 must satisfy the Code's standard of commercial good
faith. Thus, while the buyer must inform the seller that the transaction is "still trouble-
some," Comment 4 also requires that the notification "be such as informs the seller that the
transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the way for normal settlement
through negotiation."
Id. at 976.
79. Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 408 n.3 (8th Cir. 1985).
80. Id. For a discussion of the purposes of § 2-607(3)(a), see supra text accompanying notes 45-
53.
81. 502 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
82, Id. at 200-02.
83. 107 Wis. 2d 510, 319 N.W.2d 855 (1982).
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to report that the tires he purchased had blown out and resulted in "a terrible
accident."'8 4 The Paulson court reasoned that in such a context the buyer did
not need to assert a claim for damages; the buyer would have called only because
he believed the seller bore some responsibility for the accident. The court
concluded:
Inherent in notice is the concept of reasonableness. The seller must be
informed by the buyer that the buyer considers him (as opposed to
others) responsible to remedy a troublesome situation. The Code seeks
to eliminate an element of unfair surprise where a seller has not been
informed that a situation is troublesome and, therefore, cannot take
steps to correct it but only later has a lawsuit filed against him.85
In the contexts of Melody Homes and the cases cited in Paulson, the real likeli-
hood of a lawsuit should have been apparent to the seller, even though the buyer
did not explicitly assert that he intended to pursue a legal remedy for breach.
Eastern is an example of a case going very much in the opposite direction.
The most important aspect of the Eastern case in this regard is that Eastern Air
Lines and McDonnell Douglas were in the midst of a continuing contractual
relationship in which they were faced with substantial extenuating circum-
stances, including the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War.8 6 Both
parties recognized and acknowledged the exigency of the situation during the
more than three years of performance under the contract.
8 7
The Eastern court noted that the conduct of Eastern, the buyer, over the
contractual period included some statements of protest over the delays in deliv-
ery, but also reflected mutual, amicable efforts to accommodate the government-
caused delays.8 8 This equivocal course of conduct gave McDonnell Douglas,
the seller, a basis for asserting that the complaints or statements of dissatisfac-
tion made by Eastern were not enough to constitute notice that Eastern might
ultimately seek a remedy for breach.8 9 Eastern's equivocal conduct not only
84. Id. at 523-25 n.8, 319 N.W. 2d at 861-62 n.8 (citing Wojciuk v. United States Rubber Co.,
19 Wis. 2d 224, 120 N.W.2d 47 (1963)).
85. Id. at 525 n.8, 319 N.W.2d at 862 n.8.
86. The court wrote:
Although McDonnell produced evidence that some of the deliveries were late because of
strikes and labor shortages, the heart of its defense was that most of the delays were caused
by the rapid military buildup occasioned by the war in Vietnam. During the 1966-1968
escalation of the war, the Government asked the aviation industry to accord specific mili-
tary projects priority over civilian production.
Eastern, 532 F.2d at 964.
87. Id. at 962-64.
88. Id. at 977-80. The court stated:
We note first that even Eastern's most strongly worded communications can reason-
ably be construed as an effort to prod McDonnell Douglas into minimizing the Vietnam
War's impact upon production rather than as a claim for breach. As we have seen, East-
ern's March 15, 1966 letter to Douglas-perhaps its single most forceful expression of
dissatisfaction-can be viewed as a request for aid in minimizing the impact of the delays
rather than an assertion that Douglas had violated the contract.
Id. at 978.
89. Id. at 978-80. The court of appeals ultimately held that the trial court erred in deciding as a
matter of law that Eastern was not required to give § 2-607(3)(a) notice because McDonnell Douglas
was already aware the deliveries were late or, in the alternative, that sufficient notice had been given.
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undermined the import of its statements of dissatisfaction, but also might have
caused McDonnell Douglas reasonably to believe that any potential claims had
been waived. 90
The Eastern court pronounced that "[t]he buyer's conduct, then, taken as a
whole, must constitute timely notification that the transaction is claimed to in-
volve a breach." 91 Subsequent courts have read this statement in Eastern to
require that, for buyers to give effective notice, they must always go beyond a
statement of dissatisfaction and indicate they consider the seller to have commit-
ted a breach. 92 A careful review of the decision reveals that this reading of
Eastern is simply wrong. The Eastern case was marked by the presence of an
ongoing contractual relationship and equivocal conduct by the buyer. The diffi-
culty created by equivocal buyer conduct, in Eastern consisting of alternating
statements of dissatisfaction and expressions of amicable relations, is that it may
well lull the seller into the belief that defective performance has been forgiven. 93
As subsequent decisions have indicated, 94 a proper reading of the Eastern
Id. at 970. The court further held that the issue of the sufficiency of notice under § 2-607 should
have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 979-80.
90. The court concluded that the issue of waiver would be subsumed under the determination
whether adequate notice had been given. Id. at 979 n.63.
91. Id. at 978.
92. See, e.g., K&M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, 669 F.2d 1106, 1113 (6th Cir. 1982) ("the
critical issue is whether the seller 'had notice it was considered to be in breach'... mere notice that a
transaction is 'troublesome' is not enough") (quoting Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson,
587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979)); Southern Ill. Stone Co. v. Universal
Eng'g Corp., 592 F.2d 446, 452 (8th Cir. 1979) ("It is not enough that the seller be given notice of
the mere facts constituting a nonconforming tender; he must also be informed that the buyer consid-
ers him to be in breach of the contract."); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F.
Supp. 91, 96 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) ("At a minimum it must be apparent from a written notice that the
buyer, in fact, is claiming breach of the particular contract involved.").
93. Courtesy Enters., Inc. v. Richards Laboratories, 457 N.E.2d 572, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983);
Industrial Fiberglass v. Jandt, 361 N.W.2d 595, 598-99 (N.D. 1985).
94. In Lafayette Stabilizer Repair, Inc. v. Machine Wholesalers Corp., 750 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir.
1985) (applying Florida law), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the
mere making of complaints about problems a buyer had with a piece of lathe equipment was suffi-
cient to satisfy the notice requirement of breach in accepted goods without the buyer expressly indi-
cating that the transaction was believed to involve a breach. The court stated:
The district court specifically found that [the buyer] notified [the seller] on more than one
occasion that the lathe was not working, i~e., not cutting the API connections, despite
efforts to repair it. This finding may be construed as providing adequate notice under
Florida law. Under Florida law, the notice must be "both sufficient and timely." Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 973 (5th Cir. 1976). The deter-
mination of whether the notice complies with the legal requirements "typically depend[s]
upon the reasonableness of the buyer's efforts to communicate his dissatisfaction." Id.
"The question of reasonableness must be determined from the circumstances in the individ-
ual case." Id. (citing Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir.
1961)). While [the seller] contends that no adequate notice was received until six months
after the sale, the facts show that the problems with the lathe were continuing and that the
repeated efforts to repair it were unsuccessful, with [the buyer] eventually being told that
the machine needed rebuilding. That [the buyer] was patient in trying to have the machine
repaired does not render its eventual notification requesting a refund of the purchase price
inadequate or untimely when the circumstances as a whole are considered.
Lafayette, 750 F.2d at 1294.
Complaints or statements of dissatisfaction were enough in Lafayette without the buyer ex-
pressly alleging a breach by the seller. The factual distinction between Lafayette and Eastern is that
Lafayette involved a one-time purchase of a single item with a more sharply defined need to tender
presently conforming goods rather than an ongoing contractual relationship with equivocal conduct
1987]
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case does not call for magic words of notice that make an express assertion of
breach in every case. Rather, a proper interpretation of Eastern calls for an
express assertion of breach when necessary to counteract equivocal conduct or
because of other particular circumstances. The presence of these additional fac-
tors will determine whether the scribble on a piece of toilet paper will be enough
or whether the buyer will need to give a more explicit statement of intent to hold
the seller liable for breach.
Close scrutiny of these cases reveals that the divergence of opinions con-
cerning the content of adequate notice under section 2-607(3)(a) is unwarranted
and more imaginary than real. 95 Simply stated, adequate notice is that which is
sufficient to satisfy the purposes of the section, particularly the need to put the
seller on notice of a possible lawsuit. Such a rule is adequate whether the case
involves merchants or consumers. Although in most consumer cases one would
expect a lesser statement of dissatisfaction to constitute sufficient notice, there
are likely to be other consumer cases involving circumstances that require the
aggrieved buyer to give something more than a mere statement of dissatisfaction
to alert the seller to the possibility of needing to answer a lawsuit. 96
throughout by the buyer. Even though the buyer in Lafayette cooperated in attempts to resolve the
defects, id., as had the buyer in Eastern, the circumstances in the case made it clear that such efforts
were limited and they did not prevent the seller from being on notice that if the defects were not
resolved the buyer would be likely to pursue legal remedies for breach. Id.; see also Royal Type-
writer Co. v. Xerographic Supplies Corp., 719 F.2d 1092, 1102 (11th Cir. 1983) (complaints of
breach of warranty were sufficient notice even though buyer continued to order goods when seller
promised to resolve problems).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a result very similar to that of Lafayette in Reyn-
olds Metals Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 758 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law),
even though there was much less notice to the seller. In Reynolds the buyer purchased an electrical
transformer that failed within a year after it was put into service. Id. at 1074-75. The buyer immedi-
ately shipped the equipment back to the seller and made a claim for breach of warranty. Upon being
told by the seller that the equipment was out of warranty, the buyer paid for the repair and did not
make a claim again until the filing of a lawsuit two years later. Id. at 1075-76. Even with this scant
notice and somewhat equivocal post-breach action on the buyer's part, the court held that a jury's
finding of adequate notice was reasonably supported by the facts. Id. at 1078.
In addition to the subsequent Fifth Circuit cases, decisions from other jurisdictions support a
limited reading of Eastern. These other cases-which apply a more demanding reading of Eastern
by requiring notice that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach-primarily involve the type of
ongoing contractual relationship and equivocal buyer conduct that characterized the Eastern case.
See, e.g., K&M Joint Venture v. Smith Int'l, 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982) (applying California law)
(because buyer continued to order replacement parts from seller and to pay as billed without protest,
any claim that buyer considered seller to be in breach negated); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island
Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (complaints that were interspersed among more
numerous glowing reports of satisfaction were insufficient notice).
95. See Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 408 11.3 (8th Cir. 1985).
But cf. Webb v. Dessert Seed Co., 718 P.2d 1057, 1065-66 (Colo. 1986) (court finding that the giving
of notice under more stringent California standard instead of more liberal Texas standard may have
affected jury verdict).
96. In Agway, Inc. v. Teitscheid, 144 Vt. 76, 472 A.2d 1250 (1984), the buyers made an initial
complaint about pilling or deterioration in new carpet and were assured by the seller that the pilling
was normal and would cease after several vacuumings. Id. at 77, 472 A.2d at 1251. Subsequently,
the pilling stopped on two carpets but not on a third. The buyers, however, failed to renew their
complaint while at the same time promising the seller that the remaining portion of the purchase
price would be paid. Id. The buyers did not complain again until answering a lawsuit by the seller
for the price. Id. at 78-80, 472 A.2d at 1252. In assessing the effect of the initial complaint by the
consumer buyers, the court quoted Eastern for the proposition that " '[e]ven though adequate notice
may have been given at one point in the transaction, subsequent actions by the buyer may have
dissipated its effect.'" Id. at 79, 472 A.2d at 1252 (quoting Eastern, 532 F.2d at 978).
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4. The Effect of Actual Knowledge of the Breach
Several courts have had occasion to ponder the effect, apart from any notice
given by the buyer, of the seller's independent knowledge of the facts constitut-
ing a breach. Judge Learned Hand offered what has become a generally ac-
cepted resolution for this situation in American Manufacturing Co. v. United
States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,97 when he stated:
The notice "of the breach" required is not of the facts, which the seller
presumably knows quite as well as, if not better than, the buyer, but of
buyer's claim that they constitute a breach. The purpose of the notice
is to advise the seller that he must meet a claim for damages, as to
which, rightly or wrongly, the law requires that he shall have early
warning.98
The import of Judge Hand's statement is that, whether or not the seller
knows of the alleged defect, he needs to have an indication the buyer wants some
redress for a breach. 99 Although Judge Hand's holding predated the Code,
courts have been nearly uniform in following his lead; only a minority of courts
have taken the position that actual knowledge obviates the need for the buyer to
give notice.100 The courts in the minority have little reasoning to support their
position other than the argument that actual knowledge somehow prevents the
seller from being prejudiced by the lack of notice from the buyer. The minority
approach overlooks the fact notice is required not merely to convey information
about the alleged breach, but to warn that a claim for breach is being
asserted.10t
5. The Timing of Notice
Section 2-607(3)(a) requires that the buyer notify the seller of a breach in
accepted goods "within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have dis-
covered any breach." 10 2 What is a reasonable period of time to give notice, as
97. 7 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1925).
98. Id. at 566.
99. Judge Hand's statement almost certainly overstates the likelihood that the seller will know
of the alleged defect. In a great many reported cases, the seller believed that conforming goods were
delivered only to learn later that the goods were nonconforming. In either case, the seller should be
entitled to notice as to whether the buyer will overlook the defects or make a claim for breach.
100. Compare Standard Alliance Indus., Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 825-26 (6th
Cir. 1978) (following Judge Hand's approach), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Oden & Sims Used
Cars, Inc. v. Thurman, 165 Ga. App. 500, 501, 301 S.E.2d 673, 674-75 (1983) (same) with Jay V.
Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198, 1204 (E.D. Mo. 1971) (because of seller's
actual knowledge of breach, buyer "is not required to give notice of breach in any particular manner
or form, nor is he required to assert an intention to make a claim for damages or to pursue any other
available remedy.").
101. In Eastern, the court pointed out that the Jay V Zimmerman approach reflects the view
that the "sole function of section 2-607 is to inform the seller of hidden defects in his performance
.... Section 2-607's origins, however, reveal that it has a much broader function." Eastern, 532
F.2d at 971. The court went on to conclude that "[g]iven these undeniable purposes, it is not enough
under Section 2-607 that a seller has knowledge of facts constituting a non-conforming tender; he
must also be informed that the buyer considers him to be in breach of the contract." Id. at 973.
102. Although the section's phrasing contemplates that notice will normally be given after ac-
ceptance, it possibly might be given prior to acceptance. See MacGregor v. McReki, Inc., 30 Colo.
App. 196, 494 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1971) (buyer informed seller that a subsequent late delivery would
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dictated by the provisions of Uniform Commercial Code section 1-204(2),103 is
determined by looking at all the circumstances in light of the purposes to be
served by giving section 2-607(3)(a) notice.'°4 This question generally is consid-
ered to be one for the finder of fact, but on regular occasions courts determine
that a delay in giving notice was too long as a matter of law. 105 A determina-
tion that notice is too late as a matter of law should be made only on the basis
that the purposes of section 2-607(3)(a) make it unfair for the buyer to pro-
ceed-when, for example, the notice comes too late to allow the seller either to
investigate the facts on which the allegation of breach is based or to pursue a
claim against a more remote seller. 0 6
Courts are more generous with consumers than merchants in determining
when a delay in giving notice is reasonable. 107 Comment 4 to section 2-607
supports that approach, as do the practicalities involved. Comment 4 states in
part:
The time of notification is to be determined by applying commer-
cial standards to a merchant buyer. "A reasonable time" for notifica-
tion from a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards so
that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification
is designed to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith
consumer of his remedy. 10 8
Comment 4 reflects the view that the consumer quite often will take longer to
appreciate the nature of a breach and to realize the seller may be liable for it. 109
Nevertheless, if a consumer has not notified a seller of a breach for an unreason-
able period of time, then the notice should be considered untimely. 110 To hold
be breach of contract). Contra Klockner, Inc. v. Federal Wire Mill Corp., 663 F.2d 1370, 1379 n.3
(7th Cir. 1981) (in dictum construing § 2-607(3)(a) to render notice of breach before acceptance
ineffective).
103. "What is a reasonable period of time for taking any action depends on the nature, purpose
and circumstances of such action." U.C.C. § 1-204(2) (1978).
104. Speakman Co. v. Harper Buffing Mach. Co., 583 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Del. 1984); White v.
Mississippi Order Buyers, Inc., 648 P.2d 682, 684 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); American Fertilizer Spe-
cialists v. Wood, 635 P.2d 592, 596-97 (Okla. 1981); see also Slemmons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 57 Ohio
App. 2d 43, 51, 385 N.E.2d 298, 304 (1978) (defining meaning of "should have discovered" to in-
clude defects that are apparent in ordinary course).
105. See, eg., Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Ala. 1983); Armco Steel Corp. v.
Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 514-15 (Alaska 1980); Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114
Ariz. 271, 274, 560 P.2d 789, 792 (1977).
106. See, e.g., Steel & Wire Corp. v. Thyssen Inc., 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 892, 897
(E.D. Mich. 1976); Bennett v. Jansma, 329 N.W.2d 134, 137-38 (S.D. 1983).
107. See, e.g., Tarter v. MonArk Boat Co., 430 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (E.D. Mo. 1977), aff'd, 574
F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1978); Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 274, 60 P.2d 789, 792 (1977).
108. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4.
109. See, e.g., Branden v. Gerbie, 62 I11. App. 3d 138, 379 N.E.2d 7 (1978) (consumer was
intially confused about identity of remote manufacturer of allegedly defective goods); Goldstein v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 62 II1. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978) (plaintiff took considerable time
before discovering that contraceptive pill may have caused stroke).
110. In Southerland v. Northeast Datsun, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), plaintiffs
suffered physical injury and property damage when the mobile home they had purchased caught fire
because of a leak in the propane heater. Plaintiffs waited three years and eleven months before
giving notice to the seller without any apparent explanation. The court held that such delay was too
long as a matter of law. Id. at 892-93. Similarly, in Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 III. App. 3d
964, 382 N.E.2d 23 (1978), plaintiff discovered the breach on October 31, 1972, when she learned
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otherwise would effectively read into section 2-607(3)(a) an unwarranted excep-
tion for consumers. I'
6. Lack of Prejudice as Excuse for Delayed Notice
The issue of lack of prejudice arises in those situations in which the giving
of notice is delayed without reason, but the seller apparently is not deprived of
an opportunity to correct the problem, achieve a settlement, or investigate all
the relevant facts. This lack of prejudice could occur when a breach results in
personal injury or property damage that denies any cure, appears to present no
problem of disappearing facts, and is as prone to settlement at a later date as it
may have been at the time of breach."12 The lack of prejudice has also been
raised in cases in which the particular action is one of a series against a manufac-
turer based on recurrent, similar breaches, and so the defendant has reason to
anticipate that other actions will be forthcoming. 1 3 These cases may also be
viewed as posing an issue of whether notice has come in a timely fashion; that is,
the lack of prejudice goes a long way toward determining that the notice should
be considered timely. 114
On the other hand, the purported nonprejudicial delay may be considered
to render notice ineffective for at least two reasons. First, the delay in giving
notice may raise the possibility of the buyer's bad faith. Even though no demon-
strable prejudice is felt by the seller, one can argue based on comment 4 to sec-
tion 2-607 that a long and unexplained delay by the buyer in giving notice
evidences bad faith and renders the notice ineffective. A buyer acting in good
faith would be expected to seek a prompt resolution of any dispute. A second
reason that nonprejudicial delay may render notice untimely is that allowing a
lawsuit when the buyer has no excuse for a prolonged delay may result in less
tangible harm. This approach anticipates a more general staleness resulting
from simple delay and penalizes that delay through the barring of a remedy.
The foundation for this conclusion is the concept that one goal of section 2-
607(3)(a) is to protect the seller from claims on contracts justifiably thought to
that a contraceptive device had failed and that she was pregnant. She then delivered a stillborn baby
on February 19, 1973. No complaint was filed until June 2, 1975, and separate notice to defendants
was not given until September 26, 1975. The appellate court upheld the trial court's dismissal on the
grounds that notice was not timely as a matter of law. The opinion reveals no explanation for the
30- to 35-month delay between the discovery of the breach and the giving of notice. Id. at 966-67,
382 N.E.2d at 24-25.
111. See Comment, Commercial Law-Maybank v. S.S. Kresge: Reasonable Notice Require-
ment: A "Booby-Trap"for the Personally Injured Consumer, 61 N.C.L. REV. 177 (1982).
112. See, e.g., Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 135-36, 273 S.E.2d 681, 684-85 (1981).
In Maybank the buyer delayed three years before giving notice after suffering a personal injury that
the seller could not have remedied on prompt notice. The allegedly defective goods were preserved
and made available as evidence at trial.
113. See Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1207, 1210 (D. Colo.
1986) (seller was subject to large number of suits for breach of express and implied warranties based
on sales of asbestos products); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 351, 378 N.E.2d
1083, 1089 (1978) (seller was defendant in large number of prior suits based on alleged defects in oral
contraceptives).
114. See Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 350, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1088 (1978)
(if no prejudice, then notice must be timely, citing Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295
F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)).
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be closed. To allow the buyer to pursue an unexplainably delayed claim would
be an unfair surprise to the seller. Consequently, even without proving specific
prejudice on the part of the seller, a time should come when a claim will be
barred under section 2-607(3)(a) simply because the buyer has sat on it for too
long. 115
7. Initiation of Lawsuit as Notice of Breach
The courts are divided on the question whether the initiation of a lawsuit
may constitute the notice of breach in accepted goods required by section 2-
607(3)(a).' 16 Although the idea of requiring notice before the commencement of
a lawsuit has great intuitive appeal, careful consideration leads to the conclusion
that section 2-607(3)(a) should not be read to require prelitigation notice.
Rather, the filing of a complaint should be sufficient as long as all the require-
ments and purposes of the notice rule are satisfied.' 17
115. Several courts have specifically held that prejudice need not be shown. See, e.g., Ashley v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 571, 574 (6th Cir. 1980); Smith-Moore Body Co. v. Heil Co.,
603 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D. Va. 1985); Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d
507, 512 (Alaska 1980). Other courts have reached consistent decisions on the facts. See Salmon
Rivers Sportman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 356, 544 P.2d 306, 314 (1975)
(under Uniform Sales Act § 49, a four-year unexplained delay in giving notice could not be reason-
able); Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 964, 967, 382 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1978) (court
held that 30-month unexplained delay in giving notice was unreasonable without searching for preju-
dice); Branden v. Gerbie, 62 Ill. App. 3d 138, 141-42, 379 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1978) (unexplained delays of
39 months from breach and 15 months from learning identity of seller were too long for notice to be
reasonable).
116. Cases indicating that notice may come by initiation of a lawsuit, at least in some circum-
stances, include Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1493, 1499-1500 (D. Kan. 1957) (ap-
plying Kansas law); Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 637 F. Supp. 1207, 1210 (D.
Colo. 1986) (construing Colorado law); Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D. Ill.
1984) (applying Illinois law); Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 462 (Alaska 1983) (complaint
filed by a retail consumer, rather than merchant, within a reasonable period of time is sufficient
notice); Pace v. Sagebrush Sales Co., 114 Ariz. 271, 274, 560 P.2d 789, 792 (1977); Palmer v. A.H.
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 207 n.3 (Colo. 1984) (stating in dictum that lawsuit may be sufficient in
context of a retail purchase); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Il1. App. 3d 344, 351-52, 378
N.W.2d 1083, 1088-89 (1978); Smith v. Stewart, 233 Kan. 904, 910-14, 667 P.2d 358, 363-66 (1983)
(consumer would not be barred from remedy for failure to give prelitigation notice when less than a
month had passed between discovery of breach and filing of lawsuit); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co.,
302 N.C. 129, 136, 273 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1981) (allowing for possibility of lawsuit as notice, at least
with consumers); see also Hampton v. Gebhardt's Chili Powder Co., 294 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir.
1961) (applying California law under the Uniform Sales Act, court holds notice need not be given
before the beginning of lawsuit as long as it is given before it is pled); Davidson v. Wee, 93 Ariz. 191,
199-200, 379 P.2d 744, 749 (1963) (not requiring prelitigation notice under the Uniform Sales Act);
Silverstein v. R.H. Macy Co., 266 A.D. 5, 9, 40 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (1943) (no need for prelitigation
notice).
Cases indicating that initiation of a lawsuit will not be sufficient notice include Atlantic Bldg.
Sys. Inc. v. Alley Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1414, 1420-21 (D. Mass. 1981)
(applying Georgia law); Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Ala. 1983); Armco Steel
Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 512-13 (Alaska 1980); L.A. Green Seed Co. v.
Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 469, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1969); Voboril v. Namco Leisure World, Inc., 24
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 614, 615 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods.,
Inc., 273 Md. 1, 17, 327 A.2d 502, 514 (1974); Hepper v. Triple U Enters., Inc., 388 N.W,2d 525,
529 (S.D. 1986).
117. Significantly, allegations of breach by the seller are often raised as counterclaims by buyers
who have failed to pay for goods, and so have been sued by the seller for the price of goods accepted.
A degree ofjudicial suspicion, if not hostility, can be detected in cases in which the buyer appears to
be raising the allegation of seller's breach in a counterclaim as a desperate attempt to fend off the
seller's action for the price. See, e.g., Klockner, Inc. v. Federal Wire Mill Corp., 663 F.2d 1370,
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The requirement of notice as a prerequisite to bringing a lawsuit does exist
in some circumstances, such as in statutes governing tort actions against govern-
mental entities.1 18 A competent attorney acting on behalf of a plaintiff buyer
should be aware of the possibility of such a prelitigation notice requirement.
Indeed, it is rather instinctive to think that one should first give notice and only
in the absence of settlement bring a subsequent legal action. The intuitive ele-
ment seems to lead to an approach to section 2-607(3)(a) reflected in the Willis-
ton treatise. 1 9 The authors state:
[S]ome courts have found that the mere filing of the complaint was
sufficient notice. Such a solution offends one's sense of fair play and
the concept of notice. A summons and complaint is hardly within the
spirit of either the Uniform Sales Act or the Uniform Commercial
Code requirement of the giving of timely notice. The requirement of
the giving of notice cannot be circumvented. 120
Apart from intuitive reasoning, some courts have justified the rejection of a
complaint as constituting notice on the basis that a properly framed complaint
must include a pleading that notice to the seller has been previously given.1 2 1
Under this approach pleading of notice is considered a precondition to a proper
action for recovery of any remedy against a seller for breach in accepted goods.
1378-80 (7th Cir. 1981) (notice coming after eight months in counterclaim deemed too late and
witness credibility questioned); International Paper Co. v. Margrove, Inc., 75 Misc. 2d 763, 766, 348
N.Y.S.2d 916, 919-20 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (alleged notice in counterclaim deemed ineffective because it
was "not genuine" but "feigned, frivolous"). The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Hill v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980), went so far as to state that "[t]he
primary purpose of [§ 2-607(3)(a)] is to prevent the buyer from accepting goods and later refusing to
pay for them on the basis of an alleged breach of contract." Id. at 29-30, 268 S.E.2d at 302.
A buyer who stops payment because of an alleged breach would be expected to have given at
least minimal notice to the seller. Fairness would demand, however, that an aggrieved buyer have an
opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of notice given through the filing of a counterclaim if a
court adopts the more general position that the filing of a complaint may suffice. Despite the suspi-
cion that may justifiably be raised under this scenario, cases may arise in which the dissatisfied buyer
refrains from the initiation of a lawsuit because of hopes of resolving the matter through future
negotiations, satisfaction with simply stopping payment on the goods, or a distaste for litigation.
See, e.g., American Fertilizer Specialists, Inc. v. Wood, 635 P.2d 592, 593-94 (Okla. 1981) (buyer
stopped payment and purchased substitute goods when fertilizer did not work and raised counter-
claim when sued); Oregon Lumber Co. v. Dwyer Overseas Timber Prods. Co., 280 Or. 437, 441, 571
P.2d 884, 885 (1977) (buyer made only partial payment because of defect in goods and then counter-
claimed when sued for price); Carroll Instrument Co. v. B.W.B. Controls, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 654, 655
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (buyer ceased payment when goods proved defective and raised counterclaim
when sued).
118. See, e.g., Corboy, Shielding The Plaintiff's Achilles' Heel: Tort Clahn Notices to Govern-
mental Entities, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 609, 613-15 (1979) (discussing Illinois statute requiring that
notice be given to governmental entities).
119. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 41, § 22-11.
120. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 41, § 22-11, at 301 (footnotes omitted). Further, "[a]s a com-
monsense rule, it must be said that it is not within the spirit of fair play and liberal interpretation to
consider the commencement of an action as the giving of notice under the Code." Id. at 313 (foot-
note omitted).
121. See Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101, 1102-03 (Ala. 1983); L.A. Green Seed Co. v.
Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 467-68, 438 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1969); Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc.,
273 Md. 1, 17, 327 A.2d 502, 514 (1974); see also Hampton v. Gebhardt's Chili Powder Co., 294
F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1961) (citing cases under Uniform Sales Act § 49 employing similar analy-
sis); Dowdle v. Young, I Ariz. App. 255, 256-58, 401 P.2d 740, 741-42 (1965) (although lower court
entered directed verdict for seller because buyer did not plead notice, appellate court reversed and
remanded to determine whether buyer knew or ought to have known about breach).
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Therefore, the notice a seller receives from the initiation of a lawsuit cannot
satisfy the requirements of section 2-607(3)(a).122 The Maryland Court of Ap-
peals employed this reasoning in Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc. 123 The
court stated:
Since the existence of a right of action is conditioned upon
whether notification has been given the seller by the buyer, where no
notice has been given prior to the institution of the action an essential
condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and
the buyer-plaintiff has lost the right of his "remedy." Thus the institu-
tion of an action by the buyer to recover damages cannot by itself be
regarded as a notice of the breach contemplated under either sections
2-607(3)(a) or 2-608(2) [concerning notice of revocation of
acceptance]. 124
Although this position does have some logical underpinning, it becomes trans-
parent when viewed in the light of the countervailing arguments.
The basic premise for the argument that a complaint should constitute no-
tice under section 2-607(3)(a) is the simple fact that the section's language does
not expressly state a requirement of prelitigation notice.125 Section 2-607(3)(a)
requires that "[w]here a tender has been accepted ... the buyer must within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered breach notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy .... ,,126 Certainly the drafters
could have used language that expressly required notice before the commence-
ment of litigation, but the adopted language simply does not do so. Moreover,
comments 4 and 5, although addressing the matters of timeliness, content, and
application to beneficiaries, do not state that prelitigation notice is required by
the section. 127
Going beyond the neutrality of the section 2-607(3)(a) language, an even
more compelling argument for the acceptance of a lawsuit as notice is the inabil-
ity to devise a viable requirement of prelitigation notice within the structure of
the section. Consider, for example, the possibility that a party might give notice
one week and file a lawsuit the next. 128 No fathomable purpose is served by
having a prelitigation notice requirement that can be satisfied in that manner.
Section 2-607(3)(a) certainly does not establish any minimum amount of time by
which the notice must precede the initiation of a lawsuit. Significantly, the
courts and authors which have asserted that section 2-607(3)(a) requires preliti-
gation notice have not addressed the issue of a waiting period. If one were deter-
mined, however, to establish a minimum period of time for the notice to precede
122. See Clark, supra note 5, at 114-15; Dillsaver, supra note 56, at 234-36.
123. 273 Md. 1, 327 A.2d 502 (1974).
124. Id. at 17, 327 A.2d at 514.
125. Smith v. Stewart, 233 Kan. 904, 910, 667 P.2d 358, 363 (1983).
126. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1978).
127. For text of comments 4 and 5, see supra note 44 and infra text accompanying note 258.
128. See, eg., Redman Indus. v. Binkey, 49 Ala. App. 95, 274 So. 2d 621, 624 (1973) (lawsuit
initiated approximately one week after the giving of notice); Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 III.
App. 3d 964, 965, 382 N.E.2d 23, 24 (1978) (amended complaint filed approximately two weeks after
the giving of notice).
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litigation, resort could be had to the recurrent gap filler of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the standard of "reasonableness." 1 2 9 Perhaps the reasonable
time for notice to precede litigation would be enough time to provide an ample
opportunity for negotiation of settlement or investigation of the alleged breach.
The fault in incorporating such a rule into section 2-607(3)(a) is that the benefit
that might be gained from requiring such a waiting period might well be lost in
burdening the courts with yet another vague and difficult question to resolve in
determining whether an action had been properly brought.
Another compelling argument for allowing a complaint to serve as section
2-607(3)(a) notice is that the initiation of a lawsuit, if made in a timely manner,
can effectively serve all the identified purposes of the requirement of notice of
breach in accepted goods. 130 The timely initiation of a lawsuit would protect
the seller from stale claims and encourage investigation of the facts while fresh.
The initiation of the lawsuit would not prevent the seller from offering to correct
the defect, if such were feasible in the case. The seller would also be alerted to
avoid sending out defective goods to other buyers and could pursue any action
he might have against his own seller or some other responsible third party.
The Alaska Supreme Court on one occasion reasoned that the lack of preli-
tigation notice would prevent negotiation or settlement of claims,13 1 but later
expressed a more enlightened view in Shooshanian v. Wagner:132
The majority of courts do not allow the filing of a complaint to
serve as notice. We disagree, and are of the opinion that a complaint
filed by a retail consumer within a reasonable period after goods are
accepted satisfies the statutory notice requirement. The filing of a
complaint is certainly not a bar to the negotiation and settlement of
claims. To the contrary, the prospect of going to trial is often a power-
ful incentive to a defendant to investigate the claims against it and to
arrive at a reasonable agreement. A defendant may more easily and
effectively prepare for either settlement or trial when it may compel
discovery and so determine for itself the basis for a plaintiff's claims of
liability. Allowing a consumer's complaint to serve as notice will not
prevent a defendant manufacturer from raising the issue of timeliness if
it has been prejudiced by an unreasonable delay. 133
Although the court's comments were made in the context of a consumer ac-
tion,1 34 the analysis seems equally applicable to merchant buyers.
A final argument against the requirement of prelitigation notice is the diffi-
129. See Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 YALE L.J. 185, 185-86
(1967) (on use of the term "reasonable" throughout the Code).
130. The purposes of § 2-607(3)(a) are discussed supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
131. Armco Steel Corp. v. Isaacson Structural Steel Co., 611 P.2d 507, 510 nn. 13-15 (Alaska
1980) (construing a statutory provision essentially identical to § 2-607(3)(a)).
132. 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983).
133. Id. at 462-63.
134. The Shooshanian court went on to consider the specific impact on consumers and observed:
A consumer unfamiliar with commercial practices should not be barred from pursuing
a meritorious claim because he was unaware of the need to notify a remote seller of breach
before bringing suit.... In some cases, a consumer may not even know who produced an
allegedly defective product until he files a complaint and begins discovery. A rule requir-
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culty of resolving a case in which a lawsuit is filed promptly after a breach but
without prior notice.' 35 An absolute bar to any remedy for a buyer acting with
such promptness would seem unjustified, because the purposes of section 2-
607(3)(a) could be satisfied by the giving of notice through the complaint. Fur-
ther, a complete denial of remedy to a consumer in such a position would con-
flict with the general import of comment 4 to section 2-607, which provides that
the purpose of the notice requirement is "to defeat commercial bad faith, not to
deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy."' 36 One would also question the
denial of a remedy to a merchant who in good faith promptly files a lawsuit
without giving prior notice.
One resolution for the buyer who promptly files a lawsuit without otherwise
giving notice would be to dismiss the action without prejudice so as to allow the
complaining buyer the opportunity to give timely notice and then file the com-
plaint anew. Such a procedure would simply amount to a wasteful exercise of
chasing the plaintiff out of one courthouse door while allowing reentry through
another.1 37 A more efficient and preferable solution would be to allow the filing
of a lawsuit, whether by consumer or merchant, to constitute notice, provided it
was done in a timely manner and otherwise satisfied the purposes of section 2-
607(3)(a).
II. NONPRIVITY CONSUMERS AND SECTION 2-607(3)(a) NOTICE
Courts have deemphasized privity as a prerequisite for consumer actions
ing notice prior to suit could effectively prevent an injured consumer from joining a manu-
facturer as a party defendant in a suit already begun.
Id. at 463 (citation and footnote omitted). The Alaska Supreme Court sought to distinguish
Shooshanian from Armco on the basis that the former involved a consumer rather than a merchant.
At least one other writer has observed that the distinction appears to be rather superficial, especially
because the buyers in Shooshanian were alleging breach in goods that were being incorporated into a
building that was to be used for both commercial and residential purposes; id. at 457. See Braucher,
supra note 55, at 1430 n.145.
135. Smith v. Stewart, 233 Kan. 904, 667 P.2d 358 (1983), presented such a scenario. The case
involved a contract for the sale of a yacht from one consumer to another; the contract included an
express six-month warranty against dry rot. Id. at 905, 667 P.2d at 360. Dry rot was discovered on
the yacht just before the end of the express warranty period, and the buyer filed a lawsuit three
weeks later. Id. Although there was a factual dispute over whether oral notice was given prior to
the initiation of the lawsuit, the court assumed that no such notice was given for the purpose of
examining the propriety of a summary judgment decision. Id. at 909-10, 667 P.2d at 363. In that
context the court decided that the filing of a lawsuit before the conclusive giving of notice should not
be a bar to the buyer's action. Id. at 914, 667 P.2d at 366. Though the court accepted "the general
proposition of law that the giving of notice within a reasonable period of time to the seller, pursuant
to [§ 2-607(3)(a)], is a condition precedent to filing an action for recovery of damages for breach of
implied or express warranties," it nonetheless held that "[u]nder the totality of circumstances herein,
none of the purposes of the notice within a reasonable time requirement of [§ 2-607(3)(a)] would be
served by blind adherence to the generally appropriate 'condition precedent' concept." Id.
136. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4 (1978); see supra text accompanying note 108.
137. This exercise was apparently engaged in by the court and parties in Wagmeister v. A.H.
Robins Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 964, 382 N.E.2d 23 (1978). The plaintiff first filed a complaint on June 2,
1975, and after its dismissal filed an amended complaint on August 14, 1975. The amended com-
plaint was dismissed on defendant's motion on September 8, 1975; but leave was granted to file an
amended complaint apparently because no prelitigation notice had been given. Notice was then
given on September 26, 1975, and the second amended complaint, filed approximately two weeks
later, alleged service of notice of breach on both defendants in the case. Id. at 965-66, 382 N.E.2d at
24-25.
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against sellers in vertical privity situations, which involve remote vendees who
wish to recover a remedy from a seller up the distributive chain, and horizontal
privity situations, which involve not the actual buyer but a third party benefici-
ary seeking to recover from the seller.138 Uniform Commercial Code section 2-
318 has paved the way for the elimination of the requirement of horizontal priv-
ity. 139 Three alternative versions of section 2-318 were included in the 1966
official text."4° Almost every state has enacted a form of section 2-318 that
extends the seller's warranty liability for some types of harm horizontally be-
yond the actual buyer to an additional group of third party beneficiaries, who
might include family members, any natural persons, or any persons who might
foreseeably use, consume, or be affected by the goods.141
The elimination of the requirement of vertical privity has largely been the
result of judicial decisions that have allowed a remote vendee with a claim of
breach to pursue an action against his seller's seller or a similar party with
whom the vendee had no contract. 142 Courts have placed some limits on the
138. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
139. In some jurisdictions the courts have recognized an ability to go beyond the dictates of § 2-
318 in determining the limits of horizontal privity. See, ag., Green v. A.B. Hagglund & Soner, 634
F. Supp. 790, 794 (D. Idaho 1986) (construing Idaho law); Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548
P.2d 279, 288 n.25 (Alaska 1976); R. HENSON, supra note 6, § 6.10, at 250 ("regardless of the
language in any adopted version [of § 2-318], many courts seem to have been fairly adventurous in
reaching whatever results may have seemed appealing on any given day").
140. The three alternative versions of § 2-318 vary in the scope of third parties and harm in-
cluded. The text of the section reads:
SECTION 2-318 THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF WARRANTIES EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
NOTE: If this Act is introduced in the Congress of the United States this section should be
omitted. (States to select one alternative.)
ALTERNATIVE A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in
the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section.
ALTERNATIVE B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured
in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section.
ALTERNATIVE C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may rea-
sonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with
respect to injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends.
U.C.C. § 2-318 (1966).
141. For state adoptions and variations of § 2-318, see 3 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318:3 (1981); W. HAWKLAND, supra note 12, § 2-318.
142. Section 2-318 of the 1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code provided three
alternative provisions addressing third party beneficiaries and the requirement of privity. See supra
note 140 for the text of § 2-318. The most popular option, Alternative A, had an effect on horizontal
privity but did not address the matter of vertical privity. Comment 3 to § 2-318 indicated that this
consequence was intentional. Comment 3 reads in part:
The first alternative expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the family,
household and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section in this form is neutral and
is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's war-
ranties, given to the buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
1987]
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remedies that are recoverable in the absence of vertical privity. Some states, for
example, continue to require vertical privity in order for a buyer to recover for
economic loss as opposed to personal injury or property damage.' 4 3 Courts
have not been uniform in establishing which parties may recover for what type
of harm in the absence of privity, but in virtually every jurisdiction some con-
sumers will have standing to recover for some types of harm.144
As the law has expanded to allow nonprivity consumers standing to obtain
remedies from sellers, it has embodied for them a distinct advantage over buyers
with privity: the possibility of avoiding the notice requirement of section 2-
607(3)(a). Despite whatever harsh consequences might result, a consumer buyer
who does have privity with the seller and seeks to recover for a breach in ac-
cepted goods cannot avoid the notice requirements of section 2-607(3)(a).145 A
consumer with privity might well have the benefit of a very liberal reading of
section 2-607(3)(a) by a court inclined to tilt the Code in favor of the aggrieved
consumer. Those courts, however, undoubtedly would be compelled somehow
to find compliance with section 2-607(3)(a). This might be done through the
granting of a very generous time for the giving of notice,1 46 the application of a
liberal standard as to what would suffice as notice, 14 7 or perhaps the finding that
the filing of a lawsuit would constitute notice.14 8 But ultimately, the courts
would require compliance with section 2-607(3)(a).
For those aggrieved buyers and third party beneficiaries who are not in
privity with the allegedly breaching seller, the possibility exists of completely
U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3 (1972). The states that adopted Alternative A were thus left to develop
law concerning the requirement of vertical privity without the aid of the Uniform Commercial Code.
See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 287-88 (Alaska 1976). Further, the effect of
Alternatives B and C on vertical privity is uncertain at best; therefore, the case law on the require-
ment of vertical privity has been of prime importance. See, e.g., id. at 288-89; Groppel Co. v. United
States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 57-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 585-87, 489 A.2d 660, 675-76 (1985); cf. L.A. Green Seed Co. v.
Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 466, 438 S.W.2d 717, 718-19 (1969) (by statute, vertical privity no longer
required); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 315, 363 A.2d 460, 466 (1976) (third
party beneficiary of warranties not required to give notice); Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron
Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980) (requirement of vertical privity eliminated by statute).
143. See Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 234 Kan. 742, 750-55, 675 P.2d
887, 895-99 (1984); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 n.9 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); Mendelson v. General Motors Corp., 105 Misc. 2d 346, 348-49, 432 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133-34
(Sup. Ct. 1980); Comment, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the UCC Warranty Dis-
claimers, The Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement in the
Nonprivity Context, 47 U. PTT. L. REv. 873, 881-82 n.54 (1986); Note, Enforcing Manufacturers'
Warranty Exclusions Against Non-Privity Commercial Purchasers: Tie Need for Uniforn Guidelines,
20 GA. L. REv. 461, 465 n.16 (1986).
144. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, §§ 11-2 to -7 (discussing variant factors in state
laws affecting seller liability to nonprivity parties).
145. Some courts have suggested the notice requirement be waived altogether for consumers
with personal injuries resulting from defective goods. These cases are properly read to mean, how-
ever, that the cause of action is really one in tort rather than in contract, and that the notice require-
ment does not apply for that reason. See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 339-
40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-501 (1967); Fischer v. Mead-Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 737-38,
341 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259 (1973) (mem.); Hill v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W. Va. 22, 34, 268
S.E.2d 296, 302 (1980).
146. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 67-96 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66
1987] NOTICE OF BREACH TO NONPRIVITY SELLERS 135
avoiding the section 2-607(3)(a) notice requirement for breach in accepted
goods. A basic reason for this result is that many courts purportedly have read
the language of section 2-607(3)(a), which is phrased in terms of "buyer" and
"seller," in a literal manner. 149 The literal reading results in a construction that
requires notice to the immediate seller only, and prevents its application to a
buyer making a claim against a remote seller. Similarly, many courts have de-
cided that a literal reading of the term "buyer" in section 2-607(3)(a) precludes
its application to third party beneficiaries. 1 5 0
A fairer reading of section 2-607(3)(a) reveals that it does permit an inter-
pretation that would impose the requirement of notice on a remote vendee. The
section does not by its express terms limit its application to buyers and- sellers
who are in privity with each other. Further, comment 5 to section 2-607(3)(a)
directly addresses the question of notice being required from third party benefi-
ciaries and gives a clear indication that notice ought to be required in such
cases. 151
The issue whether notice ought to be required in the nonprivity contexts,
even if under a very liberal construction, is certain to continue to arise in con-
sumer sales cases. The courts that have considered the question are nearly
evenly split on whether notice should be required from remote vendees.152 In
contrast, the courts have nearly unanimously agreed that notice is not required
149. See itfra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 256-83 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 258-83 and accompanying text.
152. Ascertaining the exact alignment of the courts on this question is made difficult by the fact
that many courts have effectively required notice from a remote vendee without expressly consider-
ing the precise issue. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 115, 452 A.2d
192, 197 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983). Such courts seem to accept the symmetri-
cal argument that the buyer is obligated to give notice to any seller against whom standing is permit-
ted. See infra notes 227-34 and accompanying text. Among the cases requiring notice from the
remote vendee to the seller are Parker v. Bell Ford, Inc., 425 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Ala. 1983); Morrow
v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1976) (express holding); L.A. Green Seed Co.
v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 467, 438 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1969); Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 Ill.
App. 3d 964, 966, 382 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1978); Branden v. Gerbie, 62 Ill. App. 3d 138, 140-41, 379
N.E.2d 7, 8 (1978); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 284, 512 P.2d 776, 781 (1973)
(express holding); San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co., 104 R.I. 700, 704-05, 248 A.2d
778, 780 (1968); Carlson v. Rysavy, 262 N.W.2d 27, 29-30 (S.D. 1978); Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memo-
rial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (express holding), writ of error denied, 701
S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1986); Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 811 (Wyo.
1980) (express holding); see also Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298-99
(3d Cir. 1961) (requiring notice from remote vendee under § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act); Spada v.
Stauffer Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D. Or. 1961) (requiring notice from remote vendee to
manufacturer or seller); Dailey v. Holiday Distrib. Corp., 260 Iowa 859, 873-74, 151 N.W.2d 477,
487-88 (1967) (requiring notice from remote vendee under § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act).
The cases holding that notice is not required from the remote vendee to seller include Snell v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F.
Supp. 32, 36 (S.D. Ill. 1984); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 206 (Colo. 1984); Goldstein
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 I11. App. 3d 344, 347, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1978); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 118, 452 A.2d 192, 198 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456
A.2d 930 (1983); Hickman v. Bross, 58 Pa. D. & C. 137, 140 (1972); Vintage Homes v. Coldiron,
585 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); see also Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 355, 544 P.2d 306, 313 (1975) (notice from remote vendee not required
under § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act); cf. Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 785-
86, 635 P.2d 1248, 1256 (1981) (notice to remote seller normally not required, but exception exists
when the remote seller is involved in sales transaction).
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from third party beneficiaries.' 53 Commentators are in general agreement that
notice should be required in both the nonprivity contexts.154
Considering the broad acceptance of the proposition that reasonable notice
of an alleged breach serves good and legitimate purposes when the buyer is in
privity with the seller, the reluctance of many courts to require notice from non-
privity consumers is surprising if not exasperating. One would assume that early
notice would serve the same legitimate purposes in the nonprivity contexts and
that courts, therefore, would be inclined to apply the requirement. '55 Nonethe-
less, the trend of the courts is toward excluding the requirement of notice under
section 2-607(3)(a) in nonprivity situations.
Close scrutiny of the justifications offered by those courts exempting non-
privity consumers from the requirement of notice under section 2-607(3)(a)
reveals great weaknesses. The weaknesses include overly literal interpretation,
disregard of the section's purposes, and exaggerated perceptions of consumer
naivete.
A. Remote Vendees and Notice of Breach
The defenses available to the seller in an action brought by a remote yen-
153. See McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 1981) (construing Iowa law);
Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (construing Alabama law in
dictum); Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (construing
Florida law); Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 513 (Ala. 1979); Tomczuk v. Town of
Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 222-23, 217 A.2d 71, 74 (1965); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 620, 194 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1972); Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 376-78,
368 A.2d 993, 996-97 (1977); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 310, 363 A.2d 460,
463-64 (1976); see also Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1963) (notice of
breach of warranty not required from remote vendee); Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 85 (D.
Haw. 1961) (notice requirement not applicable to nonbuyer); La Hue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50
Wash. 2d 645, 646-47, 314 P.2d 421, 422 (1957) (construing Uniform Sales Act § 49). But see Cline
v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 976-77 (Del. 1980) (indicating that "greatly liberalized" notice
requirement should apply in all sales cases, apparently including third party beneficiaries); Lariviere
v. Dayton Safety Ladder Co., 525 A.2d 892, 898 (R.I. 1987) (expressly applying notice requirement
to third party beneficiary); Parrillo v. Giroux Co., 426 A.2d 1313, 1317 (R.I. 1981) (holding based
on implicit requirement of notice from third party beneficiary); Petro-Chem, Inc. v. A.E. Staley
Mfg. Co., 686 P.2d 589, 591 (Wyo. 1984) (stating broad requirement of notice from all who assert a
claim against a seller); Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810-11
(Wyo. 1980) ("buyer" includes any person who makes a claim under § 2-318 and notice is required).
154. See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 12, § 2-607:06, at 64 (decisions obviating notice from third
party beneficiaries described as "somewhat dubious in view of comment 5" to § 2-607(3)(a)); R.
HENSON, supra note 6, § 5.04(d), at 174-76 (possibility that a third party beneficiary might not be
required to give notice described as an "aberration"); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § I I-
10, at 424-25 (noting that comment 5 to § 2-607 affirmatively requires notice from third party benefi-
ciaries); Clark, supra note 5, at 126-27 ("the better approach is to read 'the seller' to mean 'any seller
who is sued in the warranty action' "); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Dis-
claimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 998-1001 (1966) (reading the Code to
conclude that requirement of notice in nonprivity cases "would seem inescapable"); Phillips, supra
note 53, at 464 (noting that the policy reasons for notice requirement apply regardless of privity); cf.
3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 141, § 2-318:12 (although noting that courts have decided the "privity-
bounded" language of § 2-607(3)(a) precludes the requirement of notice from a third party benefici-
ary, author indicates that "[a]ll the reasons given in support of requiring a buyer to give notice to his
seller are present in the case of the nonprivity plaintiff").
155. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 141, § 2-318:12; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6,
§ 11-10, at 424-25 ("If the manufacturer is to be held responsible for the buyer's losses, he needs the
protection of timely notice at least as much as the buyer's immediate seller.").
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dee' 5 6 is an issue of great importance in light of the likelihood that the remote
seller, severally or jointly with the immediate seller, will often be liable for injury
resulting from defective goods.' 57 The defenses available to the remote seller
include, of course, the requirement of section 2-607(3)(a) that the buyer give
reasonable notice or be barred from any remedy.1 58 Given the increased vulner-
ability of the remote seller, the purposes and goals of section 2-607(3)(a) argua-
bly are often better addressed by requiring that notice of an alleged breach be
given to the remote seller rather than the immediate seller. Notice to the remote
seller may well be required to effectively set in motion any real efforts at curing
defects, attempting settlement, or investigating facts. Additionally, the remote
seller will often be the actual party who needs protection from stale claims.
Ironically, the exemption of remote vendees from the notice requirement will
mean that the seller will have fewer defenses available in an action brought by a
party with whom the seller has not contracted than would be available in an
action brought by the seller's immediate buyer.
The number of courts that have explicitly decided whether notice should be
required from a remote vendee has increased recently, 159 but a large number of
states remain that have not addressed the issue, have touched on the dispute
only implicitly, or have left the question open without any definite resolution. 160
156. The usual players in the nonprivity cases are merchants as the sellers and consumers as the
remote vendees or third party beneficiaries. Less frequent cases involve merchant buyers bringing
actions against remote sellers. See, eg., Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J.
555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985). In a lawsuit of the latter type, this discussion should be applicable with
perhaps minor adjustments. It is less likely that cases will arise involving merchant third party
beneficiaries, because the statutory versions of § 2-318 tend to limit recovery to natural persons
rather than corporate entities. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 141, § 2-318:16. To the extent that a
merchant or corporate entity could have standing as a third party beneficiary, the discussion in this
Article should apply.
157. The remote seller is quite often the party with the deep pocket as well as the party who is
deemed to have made the relevant warranty.
158. The elimination of privity as a primary hurdle raises questions about the operation of the
other defenses. The courts have made progress in some areas by deciding, for example, that the
Uniform Commercial Code statute of limitations will apply to nonprivity consumer actions for
breach of warranty and will run from the date of the consumer's purchase. See, e.g., Patterson v.
Her Majesty Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 425, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill.
2d 548, 554, 309 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1974); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 276-77, 512
P.2d 776, 778-79 (1973). The courts have split on questions such as the availability of contributory
negligence as a defense, Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 382 n.2, 368 A.2d 993, 999 n.2 (1977)
(citing relevant cases), and have hardly begun to address other questions such as the effectiveness of
warranty disclaimers, see Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 588, 489
A.2d 660, 677 (1985).
159. See supra note 152.
160. In Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985), the
New Jersey Supreme Court was faced with an action by a merchant buyer against a remote seller.
The court ultimately decided that the action was time barred, but held that the merchant buyer
could recover from the remote seller on a breach of contract claim despite the lack of privity. Id. at
582, 489 A.2d at 674. Other courts subsequently read the Spring Motors case to eliminate the re-
quirement of vertical privity for consumer buyers as well. See, e.g., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 612 F.
Supp. 983, 985 (D.D.C. 1985). The Spring Motors court declined to rule on several questions con-
cerning the defenses available to a seller in an action by a remote vendee, including the requirement
of notice of breach in accepted goods under § 2-607(3)(a). 98 N.J. at 588-89, 489 A.2d at 677. In
Texas a split exists among the appellate courts. The Texas Court of Appeals, in Wilcox v. Hillcrest
Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), writ of error denied, 701 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.
1986), took direct issue with the earlier decision of the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Vintage
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The states that have directly addressed the question have offered several compet-
ing analyses supporting or denying the requirement of notice from a remote ven-
dee. A statutory construction argument is ordinarily used to deny a reading of
section 2-607(3)(a) that would require notice from a remote vendee; that is, some
courts have held that a literal reading of the section limits its application to only
the immediate buyer and seller. Courts that have adopted the literal reading
have typically misconstrued or ignored the purposes of section 2-607(3)(a).
Courts that have refused to require notice from the remote vendee have also
relied heavily on the premise that requiring a consumer buyer to give notice to a
remote seller would be unfair because of consumer naivete or lack of sophistica-
tion. These courts also have shown confusion over whether the cause of action
for breach of warranty is one that lies in contract or in tort, which does not
require notice. Other considerations that these courts have entertained include
the need for symmetry in expanding the availability of Code remedies and the
vouching in process of section 2-607(5).
1. Statutory Construction
Some courts have concluded that a literal reading of section 2-607(3)(a)
requires a buyer to give notice only to his immediate seller.161 Section 2-
607(3)(a) reads: "Where a tender has been accepted the buyer must within a
reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify
the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy .... ,"162 In what is essentially
a "plain meaning" approach, courts have construed the term "the seller" in sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a) to mean only the immediate seller who actually sold the goods
to the buyer claiming breach. 163 Similarly, other courts have concluded that
because the section refers to acceptance of tender, the section necessarily refers
only to the seller who has made the tender to the buyer.164 The strength of this
Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), which had decided that notice was
not required from a remote vendee to a seller, id. at 888. The Wilcox court reasoned that notice was
indeed required by an accurate reading of § 2-607(3)(a). 696 S.W.2d at 424-25 (citing Melody Home
Mfg. Co. v. Morrison, 502 S.W.2d 196 (rex. Civ. App. 1973)). The Supreme Court of Texas upheld
the Wilcox judgment on an alternative basis and reserved judgment on the issue of whether notice
was required from the remote vendee. 701 S.W.2d 842, 843 (rex. 1985). A split also exists within
the Illinois appellate courts, with at least two panels having read the seminal case of Berry as requir-
ing notice from a remote vendee. Wagmeister v. A.H. Robins Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 964, 966, 382
N.E.2d 23, 25 (1978); Branden v. Gerbie, 62 Ill. App. 3d 138, 140-41, 379 N.E.2d 7, 8-9 (1978).
Other courts construing Illinois law have held that the notice requirement does not apply to remote
vendees. Owens v. Glendale Optical Co., 590 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D. Ill. 1984); Malawy v. Richards
Mfg. Co., 150 I11. App. 3d 549, 501 N.E.2d 376, 384 (1986); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Il1.
App. 3d 344, 347, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1978).
161. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 206, 206 (Colo. 1984); Goldstein v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 347, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1978); see also Ruderman v.
Warner-Lambert Pharmeceutical Co., 23 Conn. Supp. 416, 417-18, 184 A.2d 63, 64 (1962) (constru-
ing similar language in § 49 of the Uniform Sales Act).
162. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1978).
163. The gist of the "plain meaning" approach is that unambiguous statutes with plain and clear
language require no interpretation by the courts. In following this approach, courts have refused to
consider the purpose of a statute or its legislative history. See Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The
"Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
RaV. 1299, 1299-1300 (1975).
164. One example of such an interpretation appears in an Illinois case:
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argument is obvious; a literal reading is always a primary tool of statutory
interpretation. 1 65
The plain meaning argument in this instance, as often is the case, 166 also
has obvious weaknesses. The first flaw in the argument is that the language does
not actually deny its possible application to remote sellers. The section could
have been phrased to apply clearly and strictly to immediate sellers only, by a
flat statement that notice must be given to the "immediate seller." Alterna-
tively, section 2-607(3)(a) could have been written to require that the notice be
given by the buyer to "his seller" as was done in section 2-607(5).167 The lan-
guage employed in section 2-607(5) effectively precludes any doubt that it refers
to the buyer's immediate seller only. The Code drafters could have made section
2-607(3)(a) equally limited in scope. Notably, section 2-607(5) is also more re-
strictive in the form of notice required. It demands "written notice" unlike sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a), which simply requires "notice." Section 2-607(3)(a) is not
phrased in the restrictive manner of section 2-607(5) and can be construed to
mean that the buyer must give notice to the seller from whom he seeks a remedy.
A remote seller is in fact one of "the sellers" in the distributive chain.
A second weakness with the literal reading of section 2-607(3)(a) is that the
definition of the term "seller" in Article 2 allows for flexibility in the term's
meaning. Section 2-103(l)(d) provides: "In this Article unless the context
otherwise requires . . . '[s]eller' means a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods."' 168 This definition of "seller" depends on having sold goods; remote sell-
ers fall within that definition. Moreover, even granting that the term "seller"
might normally mean only the immediate seller, a strong argument can be made
that the application of section 2-607(3)(a) to remote sellers is the very sort of
[T]he only tender which could have been accepted by plaintiff was that of her immediate
seller, the retailer. Therefore, because section 2-607(3)(a) provides for notification to the
seller "[v]here a tender has been accepted," we believe the word "seller" as used in that
section necessarily refers only to the immediate seller and, accordingly, we conclude that a
buyer is required to give notice of breach only to his immediate seller.
Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 347, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1978).
165. A Maryland court stated:
[I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that a statute should be construed so as to
give effect to the real intent of the Legislature. But in ascertaining that intent, a court must
first look to the language of the statute. "If there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the
language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of
the legislature."
Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 314, 363 A.2d 460, 465 (1976) (quoting Maryland-
Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Mayor of Rockville, 272 Md. 550, 555-56, 325 A.2d 748,
752 (1974)); see also County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143,
150-51, 485 N.E.2d 1076, 1079 (1985) ("Where that language is unambiguous, a court must enforce
the law as enacted without considering other aids."); Metro Auto Auction v. Director of Revenue,
707 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) ("Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is
no room for construction.").
166. See generally McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some
Implicationsfor Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 801-16 (1978) (evaluating a "plain mean-
ing" interpretation of the U.C.C.); Murphy, supra note 163 (discussing the application of the plain
meaning rule to statutory interpretation).
167. See Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (discuss-
ing the important distinction between the terms "the seller" and "his seller"), writ of error denied,
701 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1986). For the text of § 2-607(5), see infra note 246.
168. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(d) (1978).
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context in which the term "seller" should have a broader meaning. This con-
struction is also supported by section 1-102(5)(a), which states that "unless the
context otherwise requires words in the singular number include the plural."'169
Sections 1-102(5)(a) and 2-103(l)(d) weigh against the pedestrian argument that
the term "the seller" can only mean the immediate seller, and thus support the
view that the remote vendee should be required to give reasonable notice to any
seller from whom a remedy is sought.
Furthermore, a restrictive and literal reading of section 2-607(3)(a) is incon-
sistent with good Code methodology. The nature and purpose of the Code sug-
gest that it is a statute which should not be given to an overly literal
construction.' 70 Section 1-102(1) states that "[t]his Act shall be liberally con-
strued and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."' 7 1 Com-
ment 1 to section 1-102 elaborates on the principle:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying
purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in the
light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as
also of the Act as a whole, and the application of the language should
be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity
with the purposes and policies involved.' 72
Certainly other sections in Article 2-and in the Uniform Commercial Code
generally-contain language that is susceptible to different readings but is given
a broader application than a strict literal reading would render. 173 The broader
reading is applied, ideally, because it is consistent with the purposes and goals
served by the section. These underlying purposes of section 2-607(3)(a) support
a very strong argument that the section should be read to require notice to re-
mote sellers.
2. Consistency with Purposes of Section 2-607(3)(a)
A statutory provision that is subject to more than one interpretation should
be construed in light of its purposes and goals. The purported literal reading of
section 2-607(3)(a) is inconsistent with the purposes served by the section. The
recognized purposes of the section are to allow the seller opportunity to correct
the breach or minimize damages, attempt settlement through negotiation, inves-
tigate the facts in preparation for litigation, and protect the seller from stale
169. Id. § 1-102(5)(a).
170. See Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of Which Karl N. Llewellyn is the Hero of the Piece; Or
Searching for More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoNt. L.
REV. 139, 149-50 (1970); McDonnell, supra note 166, at 795-801; Murray, The Article 2 Prismn: The
Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1-4
(1981); Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 Wis. L.
REV. 597, 609.
171. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
172. Id. § 1-102 comment 1.
173. Section 2-201(3)(c) provides a ready example. The section provides that no writing is rc-
quired for statute of fraud purposes "with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
... received." Id. § 2-201(3)(c). An early decision read this section literally to require full payment
but subsequently a near unanimity of courts have allowed the section to apply to part payment of a
single unit. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 141, § 2-201:193.
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claims. 174 Because the remote manufacturer or seller will often be the party
ultimately chargeable in the event that a breach has actually occurred,' 7 5 the
remote seller frequently will be the real party at interest with regard to the possi-
bility of correcting defects, attempting settlement, preparing for the possibility of
litigation, and avoiding stale claims. Consequently, all of these purposes are
served by requiring notice from the remote vendee to the seller; thus, a substan-
tial case can be made for applying section 2-607(3)(a) to this category of non-
privity cases.17
6
Even though they have adopted the purported literal reading of section 2-
607(3)(a), some courts have attempted to square the literal construction of the
section with its purposes by denying that these purposes are served by notice to
the remote seller. 177 More specifically, these courts have denied that notice ef-
fectively serves the goals of protecting the seller from stale claims or allowing
attempts at correction of defects and minimization of damages. 178 One error
made by those courts is the failure to differentiate between the more general
purpose served by the statute of limitations and the more specific aim of protec-
tion from stale claims. The statute of limitations provides an absolute outer limit
of time in which a claim can be brought. Statutes of limitations reflect a societal
judgment that the public good is served by extinguishing all potential claims and
liability after a sufficient time has passed, without regard to the validity of the
claim or actual prejudice done to a party by virtue of the passage of time. 179
The policy of protection from stale claims, which is much akin to the equitable
174. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
175. The impetus behind the continued emergence of strict products liability in tort and the
elimination of the requirement of privity in breach of contract actions is the perception that in the
modem marketplace the consumer purchases goods made and advertised by remote manufacturers,
who should be held responsible for defective products. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
176. A Texas court made such an argument:
To hold [that § 2-607(3)(a) requires that a buyer give notice only to his immediate
seller] would frustrate the purpose underlying the notice requirement of section 2.607. The
buyer is required to notify the seller that a breach of warranty has occurred in order to give
the seller an opportunity to inspect the product to determine whether it was defective and
to allow the seller an opportunity to cure the breach, if any .... It would be untenable to
allow a buyer . . . to recover damages for breach of warranty from a remote seller or
manufacturer who was never even made aware that the product in question was defective
and who, consequently, never had an opportunity to remedy the defect to the buyer's satis-
faction before litigation was commenced or even to inspect the product to ascertain if in-
deed a defect existed.
Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), writ of error denied,
701 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1986).
177. See Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 514-15 (Ala. 1979); Frericks v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 313-16, 363 A.2d 460, 465-66 (1976); Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302
N.C. 129, 134-35, 273 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1981).
178. See, e.g., Maybank v. S.S. Kresge Co., 302 N.C. 129, 134-35, 273 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1981).
179. See generally Callahan, Statutes ofLimitation-Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130, 136-37
(1955) ("Protection of the social interest in individual stability is the purpose which most nearly
accords with the apparent scope of the statutes."); Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal
Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 836-38 (1983) ("moldy evidence" and
logistical difficulties created by stale claims overburden the courts and delay the hearing of timely
claims); Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185-86 (1950)
("[Clertainty of the fixed time periods clearly serves the interests of everyone.") [hereinafter Develop-
mnents]. The purposes served by statutes of limitations are often stated to be (1) protecting defendants
from stale claims; (2) saving the courts from the burden of resolving stale claims; and (3) enhancing
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doctrine of laches, has more relevance to the argument that a seller may be
prejudiced by inexcusable delay in pursuing an action even though the statute of
limitations has not yet run.180
The objective of protecting the seller from stale claims finds its basis in
comment 4 to section 2-607, which indicates that a primary goal of section 2-
607(3)(a) is to protect the seller from commercial bad faith.18' Such commercial
bad faith would be found if the merchant buyer simply sat on a claim and al-
lowed the facts to grow stale, thereby making it more difficult for the seller to
defend. No acceptable reason can be put forth for allowing a consumer to be
exempted from the requirement of good faith in giving notice under section 2-
607(3)(a). If a consumer buyer intentionally or unexplainably sits on a claim to
the prejudice of the seller, his claim for breach should be barred-just as with
the bad faith merchant, and even though the statute of limitations may not yet
have run.
The courts have also overstated the argument that remote sellers need no
opportunity to correct defects or miminize damages in consumer cases. Such
truth as does exist in that argument is found in personal injury cases, which lack
a meaningful possibility of correcting the defect or miminizing the damages be-
cause of the nature of the harm suffered. In Berry, 182 for example, the defendant
sellers probably could do little to correct or minimize the damage done by the
oral contraceptives. However, it should be observed, first, that not every con-
sumer case is a personal injury case. Second, and more important, it should not
be expected that each separate purpose of section 2-607(3)(a) will be served in
every case by the giving of notice. A particular case may not present an oppor-
tunity for correcting defects or miminizing damages, but this does not mean the
seller will not need an opportunity to investigate the facts while fresh or protec-
tion from a stale claim.183 One would expect in the Berry case, for example, that
defendants would have wanted the injured buyer to undergo a physical examina-
societal stability by limiting the life of unsettled claims. See Note, Statute of Limitations for Citizen
Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 195, 202-03 (1986).
180. One federal court discussed protection from stale claims:
One of the factors to be considered is, did the delay in giving notice or its form prejudice
the seller? The Pennsylvania cases have approached the prejudice question by engrafting
the doctrine of laches onto Section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act .... "Laches," the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court said in In re Grote's Estate, 1957, 390 Pa. 261, 269, 135 A.2d 383,
387, "arises when a defendant's position or rights are so prejudiced by length of time and
inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to
permit presently the assertion of a claim against him."
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1961); see also McCune v.
F. Alioto Fish Co., 597 F.2d 1244, 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (two elements of the defense of laches are
inexcusable delay and prejudice to the defendant); Developments, supra note 179, at 1183-85 (outlin-
ing historical development of laches doctrine).
181. See supra text accompanying note 108 (quoting portion of comment 4 to § 2-607); see also
Hazelton v. First Nat'l Stores Inc., 88 N.H. 409, 412-13, 190 A. 280, 283 (1937) (purpose of requir-
ing notice is to "give the seller timely information that the buyer proposes to look to him for dam-
ages"); Tripp v. Renhard, 184 Or. 622, 643, 200 P.2d 644, 653 (1948) (very purpose of notice
requirement is to substitute a shorter time than the limitation period for the presentation of warranty
claims).
182. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
183. See R. HENSON, supra note 6, § 5.04(d), at 175-76.
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tion by a medical expert as soon as possible to verify the cause of the physical
injury. Additionally, in personal injury cases the remote seller may have an
interest in reaching an early settlement with the consumer, which may in fact go
toward minimizing the damages.
Ignoring or misconstruing the purposes of a section of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in arriving at a construction is outrageous. Yet the courts that
have adopted the literal reading of section 2-607(3)(a) have very nearly done just
that. As one might suspect, the courts had underlying reasons for their deci-
sions, which can be found in two related sources: the concern that consumer
buyers are so naive in commercial dealings that they need special protection
when seeking remedies from merchant sellers; and the persistent confusion be-
tween the cause of action in tort for strict products liability and the cause of
action in contract for breach of warranty.
3. Consumer Naivete or Unwariness
Although courts have often justified their denial of a requirement of notice
to remote sellers based on a literal reading of section 2-607(3)(a), the late Profes-
sor William Prosser revealed an equally significant rationale behind this trend in
an often-used quotation concerning the requirement of notice in the nonprivity
context. Professor Prosser expressed disapproval of the notice requirement in
nonprivity personal injury cases, stating:
As between the immediate parties to the sale, [the notice requirement]
is a sound commercial rule, designed to protect the seller against un-
duly delayed claims for damages. As applied to personal injuries, and
notice to a remote seller, it becomes a booby trap for the unwary. The
injured consumer is seldom "steeped in the business practice which
justifies the rule," and at least until he has legal advice it will not occur
to him to give notice to one with whom he has had no dealings. 1
84
The decisions citing this catchy statement or otherwise reflecting a pre-
sumption of consumer naivete are sufficiently numerous to justify suspicion that
a predominant reason courts interpret section 2-607(3)(a) as not requiring notice
in the nonprivity consumer contexts is the fear that to do so would unfairly
disadvantage the consumer.1 85 Although courts have been preoccupied with
consumer naivete, they generally seem to have given little thought to the real
likelihood that to dispense with notice altogether will in many instances be un-
184. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 97, at 691 (5th ed. 1984) (quoting James, supra note 7, at 197) [hereinafter PROSSER ON
TORTS].
185. See Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Palmer v. A.H.
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 206 (Colo. 1984); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344,
349, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1088 (1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 116-
17, 452 A.2d 192, 197 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983); see also Taylor v. American
Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (stating that courts generally hold notice
requirement inapplicable when consumers not "buyers" under § 2-103(1)(a)); Simmons v. Clemco
Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 515 (Ala. 1979) (relying on the reasoning of cases decided in other jurisdic-
tions without engaging in an actual discussion of consumer lack of sophistication).
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fair to the merchant seller. 186 A number of cases can be cited in which the
complete abandonment of the notice requirement resulted in potential or actual
unfairness to the merchant seller. 187
Additionally, the perception of consumer disadvantage because of naivete
or lack of business sophistication is overstated. A close look at the Prosser state-
ment reveals that it is fairly riddled with fallacious assumptions. First, the state-
ment embodies a presumption that the nonprivity consumer is so lacking in
knowledge about remote sellers that he will not realize he may have the basis for
a lawsuit against a remote manufacturer or seller. This assertion flies in the face
of a primary premise supporting the elimination of privity and expanded liability
of remote manufacturers and sellers for breach of contract: courts have rea-
soned the modern marketplace has developed to the point that the consumer
very often buys on the strength of the remote manufacturer's or seller's brand
name or advertising promises rather than simply on the basis of some dickering
with the immediate seller.188 This same premise would overwhelmingly support
the proposition that the modern consumer is very likely to consider the possibil-
ity of a lawsuit against a remote manufacturer-seller, if not distributor-seller,
whenever the accepted goods are defective. 189 Indeed, in many cases the con-
sumer is extremely familiar with the remote manufacturer-seller and is likely to
consider immediately the possibility that the remote manufacturer may be liable
for harm caused by its defective product. 190 Therefore, the consumer very often
is as likely to consider an action against the remote seller as the immediate seller.
Further, the Prosser assessment presumes that the remote seller will be
truly remote in every case. This presumption ignores the possibility that in some
cases the transaction or negotiations may involve three parties-buyer, seller,
and remote seller. Carlson v. Rysavy 191 presents the example of a consumer who
visited the manufacturing plant of the remote seller before deciding to buy a
186. In a rare but unsympathetic case of judicial acknowlegement of the seller's interest in no-
tice, a Maryland appellate court noted:
Remote sellers will have to rely on each successive buyer carrying out his respective
obligation under the law [in passing notice on to his seller], which, in most instances, he
will have an economic incentive to do. If there is to be a hardship, it will have to fall on the
manufacturer or distributor who placed or maintained the defective goods in the marketing
stream.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 118, 452 A.2d 192, 198 (1982), aff'd, 295
Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983).
187. See cases cited supra note 49.
188. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 296-97 (3d Cir. 1961);
Patterson v. Her Majesty Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 425, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Rothe v. Maloney
Cadillac, Inc., 142 Ill. App. 3d 937, 942-45, 492 N.E.2d 497, 500-02 (1986); Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 248-49, 147 N.E.2d 612, 615-16 (1958); Kassab v. Central Soya,
432 Pa. 217, 227-28, 246 A.2d 848, 853 (1968).
189. The buyer can be expected to recognize initially the possibility of action against the party
that had the national notoriety. Once a buyer begins to be aware that remote parties may be liable, it
would be expected that lower-profile remote sellers are likely to be sought out as well.
190. See Note, Notice of Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 520,
530 (1973); Phillips, supra note 53, at 473 (for proposition that remote vendee will often be aware of
the identity of manufacturer of defective goods).
191. 262 N.W.2d 27 (S.D. 1978).
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mobile home from the local dealer.19 2 The remote seller in such a case is not
truly remote and unknown to the buyer. 193 The approach to section 2-607(3)(a)
that absolutely dispenses with the requirement of notice from the remote vendee
to the seller denies courts the flexibility to decide that fairness requires prompt
notice in a particular case because the remote seller is not truly removed from
the consumer buyer's knowledge. 19
4
A related question involves the role to be played by the consumer's attorney
in these types of cases. Consumers seldom pursue legal actions on their own.
The normal course of action for the consumer is to obtain the assistance of coun-
sel when he decides to pursue a legal action. In that respect consumers are
really no different from merchants. Although some merchants may be suffi-
ciently "steeped" in commercial law to appreciate for themselves the need to
give notice of breach, surely a great number of merchants rely on counsel to
address such matters.' 95 Similarly some consumers, because of common sense
or experience, appreciate the need to let the seller know of an alleged breach.
Most consumers, however, depend on counsel to address that type of matter. If
consumers generally acted on their own in pursuing remedies, then Prosser's
concern about unwariness would be more valid. Because of the common utiliza-
tion of legal counsel, consumer buyers should not be considered totally inept in
pursuing remedies and excused from giving notice in the nonprivity cases.
1 96
The Prosser perception of the unwary consumer does have a valid aspect,
but it can be addressed without completely abandoning the requirement of no-
tice. The valid concern is found in those cases in which the consumer pursues
an action for breach without counsel or delays in seeking the aid of counsel
because of commercial or legal inexperience. Comment 4 to section 2-607 indi-
cates the appropriate manner of addressing this concern is to factor the con-
sumer's inexperience into the determination of whether the notice has been given
192. Id. at 29.
193. See Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 785, 635 P.2d 1248, 1256 (1981)
(farmer-buyer of chemicals was in direct communication with remote seller before buying from re-
tailer); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 591, 489 A.2d 660, 678 (1985)
(Handler, J., concurring) (finding tripartite transaction in which merchant buyer specified that its
seller would incorporate equipment made by particular remote manufacturer); Paulson v. Olson
Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 513, 319 N.W.2d 855, 856-57 (1982) (manufacturer participated in
discussions between retailer and farmer-buyers of farm equipment).
194. See Phillips, supra note 53, at 474-76 (asserting that the better approach would be to judge
the reasonableness of notice on the basis of the consumer's knowledge in each particular case, rather
than eliminating the requirement of notice as a rule of law because of presumed consumer lack of
knowledge).
195. Consider the case of Bennett v. United Auto Parts, Inc., 294 Ala. 300, 315 So. 2d 579
(1975), in which plaintiff apparently was the owner of a small business. After being injured while
using the allegedly defective goods, the buyer immediately gave very informal, oral notice of the
breach before retaining counsel and sending a more formal letter of notice some eight months later.
Id. at 301-02, 315 So. 2d at 580. This scenario is not unlike what might be expected from a
consumer.
196. See R. HENSON, supra note 6, § 5.04(d), at 177; Franklin, supra note 154, at 997; Note,
supra note 190, at 530. Professor Henson expresses the view that the consumer's attorney should
carry the burden of giving notice, stating: "If a failure to give notice were considered to bar a
remedy, as it should be, this would put the onus on a lawyer who has not done a job properly, and a
malpractice action against the lawyer should provide a suitable remedy for a consumer as well as
employment for yet another lawyer." R. HENSON, supra note 6, § 5.05, at 177.
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within a reasonable time. 197 The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code endorsed this approach, at least to a degree, in its 1966 re-
port. The Board criticized the South Carolina amendment of section 2-
607(3)(a), which precluded application of the section to consumer personal in-
jury cases1' 98 by stating that the exception seemed "unnecessary if 'reasonable
time' is read as suggested in comment 4." 199
Allowing the consumer a properly generous time to give notice 2° provides
a resolution that not only guards against the requirement becoming a "booby
trap" for the nonprivity consumer, but also ensures the merchant will receive
notice within a reasonable time under the particular circumstances. A delay in
notice because a nonprivity consumer is inexperienced or acting without counsel
should be allowed, but not without limit. As a general rule, the merchant
should not be made to suffer through elimination of the notice of breach re-
quirement because of the consumer's presumed lack of knowledge.
The last point is further buttressed by a review of the Code sections that
establish special rules for merchants and therefore, to some degree, create excep-
tions in favor of consumers.201 A review of those sections reveals that a number
of them apply particularly to transactions "between merchants." The sections
also reflect the perception that practices among merchants are more sophisti-
cated than those involving nonmerchants. 20 2 Several of the other merchant rules
reflect the position that by virtue of regularly dealing in goods, merchant sellers
take on greater responsibility at the stages of contract formation and perform-
ance and in their dealings with third parties. 20 3 The only sections that place a
greater obligation on merchant buyers after a breach are sections 2-327(1)(c) and
2-603, which give the merchant a greater duty to take care of goods that must be
returned to the seller. 20
197. According to comment 4, "'A reasonable time' for notification from a retail consumer is to
be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended." U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 4
(1978).
198. For the text of the amended South Carolina statute, see infra note 242.
199. AMERICAN LAW INST. & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, REP.
No. 3 OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 48 (1967).
200. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text. In addition, allowing a complaint or the
initiation of a lawsuit to serve as notice helps guard against unfairness to the consumer. See supra
notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
201. The merchant rules are discussed in Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewel-
lyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEo. L.J. 1141
(1985). Professor Hillinger cites fourteen special merchant rules. Id. at 1143 n. I1; see also Wise-
man, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REv. 465, 542-45
(1987) (listing in appendix the merchant rules proposed by Professor Llewellyn and their ultimate
disposition).
202. See U.C.C. § 2-103(I)(b) (1978) (defining good faith); id. § 2-201(2) (statute of frauds ex-
ception); id. § 2-207(2) ("battle of forms" rule on deviant acceptance); id. § 2-209(2) ("no oral modi-
fication" clauses); id. § 2-605(1) (request for particularization of defects); id. § 2-609(2) (request for
adequate assurance).
203. See id. § 2-205 (firm offers); id. § 2-312(3) (warranty of title); id. § 2-314 (implied warranty
of merchantability); id. § 2-402(2) (rights of creditors); id. § 2-403(2) (entrusting of goods); id. § 2-
509(3) (passing of risk of loss).
204. See id. §§ 2-327(I)(c) & 2-603(1). For a discussion of the possibility that this type of duty
should apply to nonmerchants, see Hillinger, supra note 201, at 1158-62 (suggesting an absence of
good reasons for not imposing a "reasonable duty" on a nonmerchant to take care of rejected goods).
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Noticeably missing from the special merchant rules are any provisions re-
flecting a presumption that consumer or nonmerchant buyers are going to be
handicapped by inexperience in pursuing remedies for breach. Rather, the rules
concerning rejection and revocation of acceptance place the same burdens on
merchants and consumers, including the need to give reasonable notice to the
seller. 20 5 To the extent that the merchant rules reflect any presumption of a lack
of sophistication on the part of the consumer, the presumption arises at the time
of contract formation. This distinction is justified, because at the time of con-
tract formation the consumer may well be acting without counsel and may in-
deed suffer from a disadvantage by virtue of having little experience with
relevant business practices.
20 6
An example of the Article 2 protection of the consumer at the contract
formation stage is found in section 2-209(2).207 In order to establish a valid
clause prohibiting oral modifications in a standard form agreement supplied by a
merchant, section 2-209(2) requires that a consumer separately sign such a pro-
vision.20 8 Another example is found in the statute of frauds provisions of sec-
tion 2-201(2),209 wherein a failure to respond to a confirming memorandum
precludes a statute of frauds defense for merchants but not consumers. 210
These observations about the general treatment of the consumer in Article 2
demonstrate that the consumer is provided increased protection at the contract
formation stage, but not when seeking remedies for breach. This approach com-
ports with the logic that at the time of seeking remedies for breach, most con-
sumer buyers are going to enlist the aid of an attorney and, presumably, stand
on equal footing with the merchant sellers. Remote vendees and other consum-
ers may purchase goods on their own, but they often pursue remedies for breach
205. Sections 2-602 and 2-608 govern rejection and revocation of acceptance, respectively, and
neither section creates for consumers any special allowances or exemption from giving notice. Com-
ment 5 to § 2-608 does state that "[f]ollowing the general policy of this Article, the requirements of
the content of notification are less stringent in the case of the non-merchant buyer," but does not
suggest that the buyer should be excused from the requirement of giving notice. U.C.C. § 2-608
comment 5.
206. This scenario occurred in Smith v. Stewart, 233 Kan. 904, 667 P.2d 358 (1983), in which
one consumer contracted to buy from another nonmerchant a boat to be used by his family as a
pleasure craft. The two consumers negotiated and executed the sales agreement on their own with-
out the assistance of counsel, but after defects in the boat were uncovered and a dispute arose both
parties retained counsel. Id. at 905, 667 P.2d at 360.
207. This section reads: "A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission except
by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants
such a requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed by the other
party." U.C.C. § 2-209(2).
208. Although the language of § 2-209(2) is somewhat convoluted, its effect is to require a spe-
cial signature to make a "no modifications except in writing" clause binding on a consumer when a
merchant's standardized form is used. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 6, § 43 ("[T]he consumer
will be protected unless such a clause is brought to his attention for his signature.").
209. This section reads:
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the con-
tract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to
know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) [establishing statute of
frauds writing requirements] against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is received.
U.C.C. § 2-201(2).
210. See R. HENSON, supra note 6, § 1.02, at 4-5.
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with the assistance of attorneys and should be held to the requirement of giving
notice of breach in accepted goods.
4. Confusion of Contract Warranty with Strict Products Liability
Another factor motivating courts to excuse consumers from the section 2-
607(3)(a) notice of breach requirement is the recurrent confluence of claims
based on breach of warranty in contract with those based on strict products
liability in tort. 21' Both causes of action typically find application in cases in
which a consumer purchases goods that prove defective and cause personal in-
jury or property damage. The tort cause of action does not present an issue of
notice, however, because the strict products liability doctrine does not require
notice to the responsible seller as a prerequisite to stating a proper claim.212
A reasonable basis exists to suggest that courts which have decided that
section 2-607(3)(a) notice of breach should not apply in the nonprivity contexts
have been overly influenced by the tort rules. Such courts have effectively elimi-
nated the notice requirement in both tort and contract claims, and have repeated
what some courts did in personal injury cases predating adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code.2 13 Most of the nonprivity cases in which courts have de-
cided that section 2-607(3)(a) notice does not apply involve personal injury, and
evidence exists that courts may still be confusing contract and tort causes of
action.214 The confusion results in part from the coincidental development of
the doctrine of strict products liability in tort and the undoing of the require-
ment of privity as a basis for asserting a claim of breach of warranty. 215 Despite
211. Some commentators have discussed the injection of elements of fault into strict products
liability issues. See Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the
UC.C., 48 Mo. L. REV. 1, 23 (1983) (noting that strict liability has "overtones" of culpability and
.elements" of fault). That distinction does not affect the ensuing discussion and therefore the tort
claims will simply be referred to as "strict products liability" claims.
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965). But see Phillips,
supra note 53 (questioning the nonapplication of a requirement of notice in tort cases).
213. In Kennedy v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 205 A.D. 648, 200 N.Y.S. 121 (1923), the court
stated:
The complaint to be sufficient did not need a notice under section 130 of the Personal
Property law.... To require a complaint which, whatever its nomenclature of form, is
really grounded on tortious elements, to indicate a notice of rejection or claim of damage
within a reasonable time on account of defect of edible goods in a retail transaction, would
strain the rule beyond a breaking point of sense or proportion to its intended object.
Id. at 649-50, 200 N.Y.S. at 122; see also Bennett v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150, 153.
54 (E.D. Ill. 1964) (construing Illinois law under the Uniform Sales Act § 49 not to require notice of
breach of implied warranty of fitness for human consumption); Wright-Bachman, Inc. v. Hodnett,
235 Ind. 307, 312, 133 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1956) (construing § 49 not to require notice in personal
injury cases); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 339-40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 501 (1967)
(treating breach of contract action involving personal injury as one for tort strict liability).
214. See Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1973); Hill
v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W. Va. 22, 28-30, 268 S.E.2d 296, 302-03 (1980) (dictum); W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 12, § 2-607, at 63; Comment, supra note 11, at 180-81.
215. See generally Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968, 976 (Del. 1980) (finding strict liability
has basis in tort and contract, areas are "intertwined"); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or.
273, 285, 512 P.2d 776, 781 (1973) (Denecke, J., concurring) (noting the historical, parallel develop-
ment of strict liability in both tort and contract and problems associated with distinguishing the
two); PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 184, §§ 97-98 (comparing the development of strict liability in
warranty and strict liability in tort); Franklin, supra note 154, at 996-1004 (discussing impact of
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some questioning of the distinction between contract warranty and tort strict
products liability claims, 21 6 the two causes of action have definite differences.
The cause of action for strict liability in tort finds its basis in a societal
judgment that one sending inherently dangerous goods into the marketplace
should be held responsible for personal injury and property damage caused by
those goods. 217 Further, courts and legislatures have decided that the manufac-
turer is in a better position than the individual consumer to bear the risk of loss
resulting from dangerous products. 2 18 A cause of action for breach of contract
warranty, however, is founded on the basic concept that the seller has delivered
to the consumer buyer less than he promised.21 9 The cause of action accrues
from a promise, whether express or implied, that is breached and, therefore, the
warranty cause of action is contractual in nature.
Although courts and commentators have debated over the propriety of the
overlap between the two causes of action,220 the coexistence of two potential
causes of action arising out of one transaction must be accepted as the current
state of the law.22 1 It is less than clear that the overlap is something to be
avoided. 222 A consumer will occasionally have difficulty making out one claim
Code breach of warranty action on tort strict liability); Phillips, supra note 53 (arguing that notice
should not be dispensed with merely because an action is grounded in tort).
The acceleration of the fall of privity in contract is usually tied to the decision in Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The beginning of general theories of tort
strict products liability is usually dated to Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Professor Franklin does detail some earlier developments.
Franklin, supra note 154, at 990-92.
216. Professor Prosser once asserted that the breach of warranty action was "born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract." Prosser, supra note 42, at 800; see also Gilmore, Products Liability:
A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103, 109 (1972) (stating that the law of warranty "has always
had one foot in contract and the other foot in tort"). But see Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 728-34 (1970) (rebutting
argument that warranty is a product of pure tort theory and asserting that warranty finds its histori-
cal basis in contract).
217. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 902, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 184, § 98; Gaebler, Negligence, Economic
Loss, and the UC.C., 61 IND. L.J. 593, 593 (1986).
218. Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1985); Spring Motors
Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 567-68, 489 A.2d 660, 666 (1985); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
219. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 571, 489 A.2d 660, 668
(1985); PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 184, § 92.
220. See Wade, supra note 211, at 1-4.
221. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 570, 489 A.2d 660, 667-
68 (1985); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or. 273, 279, 512 P.2d 776, 779 (1973); Wade,
supra note 211, at 3. Every jurisdiction except Louisiana has adopted the warranty provisions of
Article 2, and approximately 45 states have adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts or
a similar doctrine. Gaebler, supra note 217, at 594 n.5. Delaware appears to be the only state
deciding that Article 2 pre-empts the products liability area. See Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d
968, 980 (Del. 1980); Wade, supra note 211, at 3.
222. An early commentator noted reasons for the overlap:
Indeed, in many cases an action as for tort or an action as for a breach of contract may be
brought by the same party on the same state of facts. This, at first blush, may seem in
contradiction to the definition of a tort, as a wrong unconnected with contract; but the
principles which sustain such actions will enable us to solve the seeming difficulty.
If one by means of a false warranty is enabled to accomplish a sale of property, the
purchaser may have his remedy upon the contract of warranty, or he may bring suit for the
tort. The tort consists in his having been, by fraud and falsehood, induced to make the
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but not the other.2 23 However, a division of the causes of action follows natu-
rally from the fact they address different legal principles. The strict products
liability claim requires the consumer to prove that the product was unreasonably
dangerous.2 24 The breach of contract claim requires the buyer to show that a
representation as to the quality of the goods was explicitly or implicitly made
and that the goods failed to meet the warranty.2 25 In addition to differences in
the burdens of proof, the statutes of limitations may be different, disclaimers are
likely to be effective in contract but not in tort, and notice is required only in the
contract claim. Ultimately, the remedial goals of the tort and contract claims
are different. Tort remedies are aimed at returning the injured party to the sta-
tus quo ante, which involves undoing the harm. In contrast, the contract rem-
edy is designed to give the buyer the value agreed to be exchanged in the
bargain.226
It is somewhat understandable that confusion in the courts would have oc-
curred because of the parallel development of strict products liability in tort and
the elimination of privity as an essential element in contract actions, with the
resulting effect that notice was excused in some contract warranty claims. Pres-
ent-day courts, however, should recognize the differences between the two ex-
isting causes of action, and not allow the confluence to result in the slighting of
the statutory requirement of notice of breach in accepted goods when a contract
cause of action is advanced. If the consumer seeks to recover a remedy from a
seller as a remote vendee in an action for breach of contract, then the buyer must
satisfy the requisites of the Uniform Commercial Code, including the giving of
reasonable notice of breach in accepted goods.
5. Preservation of Symmetry and Legislative Intent
The concept of preservation of symmetry is simple but very logical: to the
extent the seller is exposed to potential liability to additional nonprivity parties,
balance or symmetry should be preserved by providing to the seller the normal
Code defenses to an action for breach of contract. 227 Courts have given varying
responses to this proposition in deciding whether the section 2-607(3)(a) notice
requirement should apply to nonprivity consumers. Although several courts
have been persuaded that when a breach of contract action is extended to remote
vendees they should be subject to the same requirements and limitations as im-
purchase. There is a broken contract, but there is also something more: There is deception
to the injury of the purchaser in procuring the contract to be made.
1 T. COOLEY, TORTS 169-71 (4th ed. 1932).
223. See Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 570-71, 489 A.2d 660,
668 (1985); PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 184, § 92, at 664-67; Phillips, supra note 53, at 457.
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965).
225. See Wade, supra note 211, at 7 (primary concern of Article 2 is "enforcing the sales
contract").
226. See Wade, supra note 211, at 24.
227. Briefly, the defenses that ordinarily might be available to the seller would include the notice
requirement, statute of limitations, misuse or similar conduct by the buyer, and warranty disclaimer
or limitation. See supra note 158.
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mediate buyers,2 2 8 other courts have implicitly rejected the symmetry argu-
ment. The latter decisions rest largely on the reasoning that requiring notice
from a consumer to a remote manufacturer or seller would be too much to ask of
the consumer, and that notice given to an immediate seller will naturally flow
upward to the remote seller. 22 9 Apart from severe doubts about the arguments
that the consumer is too naive to recognize the need to give notice2 30 and that
notice given to an immediate seller will flow up to the remote seller,2 3 1 the con-
cept of preserving symmetry is both rational and persuasive.
The lack of symmetry and logic in exempting remote vendees from the no-
tice requirement becomes increasingly obvious when one considers the effect of
such an approach on the notice defenses that are available to immediate and
remote sellers. If a buyer fails to give any notice at all, he cannot sue the imme-
diate seller but may still pursue a cause of action against the remote seller. This
result is incongruous with the fact the immediate seller by virtue of proximity is
more likely to be aware of a breach than is the remote seller, who may be many
transactions removed from the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the consumer who fails to
give notice at all will yet be able to bring an action against a remote seller in the
distributive chain. One way courts may mitigate this result is to decide that the
failure to give notice to the immediate seller will be a good defense for the re-
mote seller. Although at least three courts have adopted this approach, 232 the
approach offers no assurance or even likelihood that notice given to the immedi-
ate seller will reach or benefit the remote seller. The remote seller, though,
would have as a defense the buyer's failure to give a notice that was neither given
to the remote seller nor would have benefited him in any way.2 3 3 This result
makes no more sense than would allowing the immediate seller to defend by
asserting that no notice was given to the remote seller.2 34
228. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 518 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1977); Prutch v. Ford
Motor Co., 40 Colo. App. 129, 134, 574 P.2d 102, 106 (1977), rev'd, 618 P.2d 657 (Colo. 1980);
Wilcox v. Hillcrest Memorial Park, 696 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), writ of error
denied, 701 S.W.2d 842 (rex. 1986); Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d
806, 810-11 (Wyo. 1980).
229. See Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 655-56 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Goldstein v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349, 378 N.E. 2d 1083, 1087-88 (1978); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 116-18, 452 A.2d 192, 196-97 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 528,
456 A.2d 830 (1983); see also Tomezuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 223, 217 A.2d 71,
73 (1965) (conceding the desirability of maintaining symmetry through the requirement of notice
from third party beneficiaries, but declaring that requiring symmetry would be a legislative
function).
230. See supra notes 184-210 and accompanying text.
231. See infra notes 245-54 and accompanying text.
232. See Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Hawkinson v. A.H.
Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 1313 (D. Colo. 1984); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 I11. App.
3d 344, 349, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1087-88 (1978).
233. See, e.g., Malawy v. Richards Mfg. Co., 150 I11. App. 3d 549, 501 N.E.2d 376, 384 (1986).
The immediate seller had notice promptly upon discovery of the defect, but the remote seller did not
receive notice until 40 months later. Under the approach followed by the case cited, Goldstein v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978), the remote seller would have been
able to defend on the lack of notice to the immediate seller even though he did not benefit from it in
any way.
234. See Leeper v. Banks, 487 S.W.2d 58, 59-60 (Ky. 1972) (notice given to remote manufac-
turer was ineffective in suit against immediate seller); San Antonio v. Warwick Club Ginger Ale Co.,
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Under the construction of section 2-607(3)(a) that would require a buyer to
give notice to immediate and remote sellers, each seller would stand separately
as to the defense. The essence of section 2-607(3)(a) is the idea that a party who
later is to be charged with having committed a breach should have notice at that
time so as to minimize liability and avoid prejudice in resolving the matter. To
the degree that Article 2 is to be expanded to assign greater liability to remote
sellers, the expansion should be accomplished in an equitable manner by pre-
serving for the seller, as much as is possible, the normal defenses under the
Code.
Symmetry is also related to the question of legislative intent. Although dis-
cussions of legislative intent have been included more often in decisions consid-
ering whether notice ought to be required from third party beneficiaries, 235 at
least one court has found it relevant to the question of whether notice of breach
in accepted goods should be required from remote vendees. The Maryland
Court of Special Appeals in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon2 36 noted
that when the legislature expanded warranty coverage to include remote seller
liability to nonprivity parties, it also could have amended section 2-607(3)(a) to
require notice from remote vendees.2 37 The court reasoned that because the
legislature did not specifically require such notice from remote vendees, it must
not have intended such a requirement.2 38
The Maryland court did concede, however, that it was essentially guessing
about legislative intent: there was no way to certify that the state legislature had
recognized the relationship between privity and notice or considered the possi-
ble application of section 2-607(3)(a) to remote vendees. 239 Indeed, because the
elimination of the vertical privity requirement has largely been the result of judi-
cial decisions,2 4° the vast majority of legislatures have seldom specifically con-
sidered whether notice should be required from remote vendees. The only three
legislatures that can be deemed to have considered the question are those in
Maine, Massachusetts, and South Carolina. In these three states either section
2-607 or section 2-318 has been directly altered to change the application of the
notice requirement.2 41
Even in the three states where the law on notice of breach in accepted goods
was specifically altered, the impact was not to differentiate generally between the
notice required from privity and nonprivity parties. The Maine and South Caro-
lina laws were altered to eliminate the requirement of notice in personal injury
cases.2 42 These modifications do not indicate that the respective legislatures
104 R.I. 700, 708, 248 A.2d 778, 780 (1968) (notice given to remote seller within four months, but
not to immediate seller until eight months later, was ineffective as against immediate seller).
235. See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying text.
236. 53 Md. App. 106, 452 A.2d 192 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983).
237. Id. at 118, 452 A.2d at 198.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
241. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-607 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (Law.
Co-op. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607 (Law. Co-op. 1966).
242. In Maine § 2-607 was changed by the addition of a subsection, which reads: "Subsection
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contemplated a different requirement for privity or nonprivity parties. Massa-
chusetts law was altered to eliminate the requirement of notice in nonprivity
cases, but only when the failure to give notice does not result in demonstrable
prejudice to the remote seller. 243 The Massachusetts version of section 2-318 is
somewhat atypical in that it is designed to cover products liability cases that
would be addressed in most other jurisdictions by section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.2 44
Apart from what can be gleaned from these limited changes in the men-
tioned states, the only ascertainable legislative intent is that to be found by virtue
of a state's adoption of Article 2, including section 2-607(3)(a). The legislative
adoption of section 2-607(3)(a) suggests that to the extent most legislatures have
considered the question, they have favored the principle of reasonable notice to a
seller who is accused of a breach. As the courts expand warranty liability of
sellers to remote vendees they would be wise to preserve the ascertainable legis-
lative design, which includes the requirement of reasonable notice as a prerequi-
site to an action for breach.
6. Up-Flowing Notice and Section 2-607(5) Vouching In
A number of courts have reasoned that the buyer should not be required to
give notice to remote sellers because the immediate seller and others in the dis-
tributive chain will pass the notice up to preserve rights against their own sellers
under section 2-607(3)(a).2 45 This reasoning hints at the vouching-in provisions
(3), paragraph (a) shall not apply where the remedy is for personal injury resulting from any
breach." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-607(7) (Supp. 1986). The Maine legislature also altered
§ 2-725(2) to indicate that personal injury claims are subject to the general tort statute of limitations,
id. § 2-725(2), thus suggesting some conscious intent to adapt the Code provisions to cover what
otherwise might be tort cases. In South Carolina § 2-607(3)(a) was changed to read:
Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discov-
ered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy; however, no
notice of injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall be required.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1966).
243. Section 2-318 in Massachusetts now reads:
Lack of privity between plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action
brought against the manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods to recover damages for
breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence, although the plaintiff did not
purchase the goods from the defendant if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufac-
turer, seller, lessor or supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be af-
fected by the goods. The manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section. Failure to give notice shall not bar recovery under this sec-
tion unless the defendant proves that he was prejudiced thereby. All actions under this
section shall be commenced within three years next after the date the injury and damage
occurs.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (Law. Co-op. 1974).
244. See Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 412, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (1984); Correia v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 353, 446 N.E.2d 1033, 1039 (1983).
245. See Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ala. 1984); Palmer v. A.H.
Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 206 (Colo. 1984); Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co., 62 Ill. App. 3d 344,
34849, 378 N.E.2d 1083, 1087 (1978); Cannon, 53 Md. App. at 118, 452 A.2d at 198; see also
Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 785, 635 P.2d 1248, 1255-56 (1981) (court
favorably citing position that consumer should be able to direct notice of defects to immediate seller,
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of section 2-607(5).246 The import of section 2-607(5) is that an immediate seller
may give notice to his seller that he has been sued and force the remote seller
either to enter and defend the suit or be bound in any subsequent action by
adjudication of common questions of fact decided in the first litigation.247
Courts might be inclined to use this section as a basis for denying a right to
notice to remote sellers on the theory that the scheme of section 2-607(5) pro-
vides an appropriate mechanism for the remote seller to receive indirect notice
of an alleged breach as it flows upward from the buyer to the immediate seller to
any remote sellers. Substantial flaws exist in the perception that notice given to
the immediate seller will flow up to reach remote sellers against whom the buyer
might decide to bring an action.
The court in Goldstein v. G.D. Searle & Co.,248 which appears to have been
the starting point of the up-flowing notice concept, stated wistfully:
The relevant inquiry here, however, is whether the Code requires
that the notice given to the immediate seller be transmitted upstream
.... It appears to us that section 2-607(3)(a) provides such a require-
ment by viewing the acceptance of each tender of the goods moving
down the distributive chain as a distinct and separate transaction. In
this manner, whether one or more of those upstream of the consumer
in the distributive chain is ultimately sued for breach of the implied
warranty by the consumer, the Code envisions that when the con-
sumer's notice of breach is given to his immediate seller, such person
to preserve any right of action he may have for breach of implied war-
ranty will give notice to his immediate seller, and so on upstream until
the seminal point of the distributive chain is reached....
The implied warranty of the manufacturer is tendered along with
the goods to the ultimate consumer by his immediate seller, and notice
to the immediate seller in the ordinary course of events enures to the
benefit of the remote manufacturer.249
Two fallacies exist in the Goldstein analysis. First, the intermediate buyer may
who would then decide if correction was within his ambit or if the notice of breach should be passed
upstream to the remote seller).
246. U.C.C. § 2-607(5) reads:
Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which the
seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the
seller may come in and defend and that if the seller does not do so he will be bound in any
action against him by his buyer by any determination of fact common to the two litiga-
tions, then unless the seller after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and defend
he is so bound.
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection (3) of Section 2-312) the
original seller may demand in writing that his buyer turn over to him control of the litiga-
tion including settlement or else be barred from any remedy over and if he also agrees to
bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then unless the buyer after seasonable
receipt of the demand does turn over control the buyer is so barred.
Id.
247. Begley v. Jeep Corp., 491 F. Supp. 63, 65 (W.D. Va. 1980); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers
Gasket & Mfg. Co., 177 Ind. App. 508, 521, 380 N.E.2d 571, 580 (1978); R. HENSON, supra note 6,
§ 5.04(c).
248. 62 II1. App. 3d 344, 378 N.E.2d 1083 (1978).
249. Id. at 348-49, 378 N.E.2d at 1087.
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not have an action for breach of warranty against his own seller, perhaps be-
cause of an effective disclaimer. Second, the intermediate buyer may have a
means of recovery against his seller for indemnity without having to state a
cause of action for breach under Article 2.250 In any event, the typical posture
of the reported cases suggests it is far from clear that notice given to the immedi-
ate seller will flow up to the remote sellers. These cases also suggest that the
buyer will often choose to sue the remote seller only.2 5 1
As for vouching in, section 2-607(5) notice has different requirements and
serves a very different purpose than section 2-607(3)(a).25 2 Section 2-607(5) cre-
ates an option for the benefit of the immediate seller that allows him to bind his
own seller to adjudication of facts in an action by the buyer. Section 2-607(5) in
no way assures that the remote seller will have the sort of early notice to be
provided under section 2-607(3)(a). First, it is worth repeating that the section
2-607(5) vouching-in process is indeed optional to the immediate seller; she may
250. Apart from pursuing a separate cause of action for breach under Article 2, the immediate
seller may well have an action for common law implied indemnity. The action would be under the
common law, because Article 2 has no indemnity provision. Common-law indemnity is based on the
equitable principle that a faultless party may obtain indemnity when the wrongful act of the indem-
nitor causes liability to a third party. Common-law indemnity has been applied in sale of goods
cases. See Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 112 (3d Cir. 1985) (construing New
Jersey law); Latimer v. William Mueller & Son, Inc., 149 Mich. App. 620, 386 N.W.2d 618, 626
(1986). Although vouching in may bind the remote seller to determinations of law common to both
litigations, statutory vouching in would not be necessary for implied indemnity. In Hill v. Joseph T.
Ryerson & Son, Inc., 165 W. Va. 22, 268 S.E.2d 296 (1980), the court stated:
[The remote seller] asserts as a first defense that it was given no timely notice by the
[immediate seller] of the plaintiff's [buyer's] claim for injuries arising out of the defective
product. Under the principles of implied indemnity, however, notice to the indemnitor is
not required unless the indemnitee seeks to bind the indemnitor to the original judgment.
Id. at 28, 268 S.E.2d at 301-02. But see City of Clayton v. Grumman Emergency Prods., Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 1122, 1128 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (construing § 2-607(5) vouching-in notice to be element of claim
for indemnity).
251. See Cannon, 53 Md. App. at 121-22, 452 A.2d at 200 (Lowe, J., concurring). In responding
to the majority's up-flowing notice argument, the concurring justice stated:
To rationalize as fair warning for a lack of notice requirement by suggesting that an in-
staller will notify a retailer, who will notify a wholesaler, who will notify a distributor, who
will notify a subsidiary, who will notify a manufacturer, is hardly convincing. That such a
relay team would ever exist is not too likely, since here as in most cases, the initial [sic]
seller and the ultimate manufacturer are not attacked upon related theories. In this case
the retailer ... apparently retained ... the installer, which Firestone suggests caused the
blowout by pinching the tube upon improper installation. Neither [the installer nor the
retailer] had any great incentive to notify Firestone propitiously to investigate that possibil-
ity. Rather, the year and a half that elapsed during which the crucial evidence to make
such determination disappeared, enured to their benefit when the deep-pocketed manufac-
turer was ultimately sued.
Id.
252. One district court distinguished the two notice requirements as follows:
[T]he intermediate seller is required to give notice of a breach of warranty to his seller
under subsection 3(a) in order to preserve his rights, but he may also give him notice of
litigation regarding the breach if he wishes to bind him to adjudication of common ques-
tions of fact arising out of suit by the subpurchaser.
Begley v. Jeep Corp., 491 F. Supp. 63, 65 (W.D. Va. 1980); see Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket &
Mfg. Co., 177 Ind. App. 508, 521, 380 N.E.2d 71, 579-80 (1978); see also R. HENSON, supra note 6,
§ 5.04, at 173-74 (vouching-in notice must be in writing, must state that the remote seller will be
bound by adjudication in the first case, and is not subject to the same time strictures as breach
notice); Clark, supra note 35, at 138-45 (discussing policy considerations and pitfalls of vouching-in
procedure under § 2-607(5)).
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elect not to vouch in the remote seller and may still be able to pursue an indem-
nity action later. Second, the timing of the vouching-in process is tied to the
initiation of a lawsuit against the immediate seller rather than her receipt of
notice of breach from the buyer. A buyer might conceivably give effective notice
of breach soon after acceptance and then wait years before actually initiating
litigation. Not only may the lawsuit come much later than the reasonable time
for giving notice under section 2-607(3)(a), but the buyer may well decide to
seek a remedy from the remote seller without ever bringing suit against the im-
mediate seller. In this event there would not be the initial act to start any up-
ward flow of vouching in notice to the remote seller.
The one aspect of up-flowing notice and the vouching-in process that may
be relevant to the requirement of notice under section 2-607(3)(a) is that in some
cases actual notice may be received by the remote seller as a result of these
processes. There are two ways in which the receipt of such notice may properly
satisfy section 2-607(3)(a) with regard to the remote seller. First, in some cases a
court might decide that the giving of notice to the immediate seller should be
chargeable to the remote seller because of an agency or quasi-agency relation-
ship between the two sellers.25 3 Second, a court might decide under appropriate
circumstances that the giving of notice to the immediate seller was the appropri-
ate mode for giving notice under Uniform Commercial Code section 1-201(26),
which requires only that one take "such steps as may be reasonably required to
inform the other in the ordinary course whether or not such other actually
comes to know of it."'254
Through liberal but sound interpretation of section 2-607(3)(a), notice to
the immediate seller may result in notice being chargeable to the remote seller.
However, such decisions should rely on the existence in fact of some tie between
the immediate and remote seller rather than doing away completely with the
requirement of notice on the fallacious grounds that up-flowing notice or the
vouching-in process will normally lead to the receipt of notice by the remote
seller.
B. Third Party Beneficiaries
The obvious difference between a third party beneficiary and a remote ven-
dee is simply that the former is not a buyer and has not been party to a sales
transaction. 255 Despite this basic difference in status, a review of the cases
reveals that much of the foregoing discussion concerning the requirement of no-
tice from a remote vendee to a seller is also relevant in considering the applica-
253. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
254. U.C.C. § 1-201(26) (1978); see supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
255. Arguably, if § 2-607(3)(a) cannot be construed to require notice from a remote vendee to a
nonprivity seller, then it would follow that the section should not be read to require notice from a
third party beneficiary. If one concludes, however, that notice should be required from a remote
vendee to a seller, as the foregoing section argues, then the possibility logically follows that the
requirement of notice of breach in accepted goods might also be required from a third party benefici-
ary. Moreover, if one reads § 2-607(3)(a) in light of comment 5 to require notice from third party
beneficiaries, then it would follow that notice from remote vendees to nonprivity sellers ought to be
required as well.
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tion of section 2-607(3)(a) to third party beneficiaries. This discussion of the
requirement of notice from a third party beneficiary is divided into three issues:
the construction of section 2-607(3)(a) in light of comment 5 to that section; the
perception of consumer unwariness in situations involving third party benefi-
ciaries; and the legislative intent governing the extension of warranty coverage
to third party beneficiaries by virtue of adoption of section 2-318.
1. Statutory Construction and Official Comment 5
Virtually all courts addressing the question have decided that the require-
ment of notice of breach in accepted goods should not be applicable to third
party beneficiaries. 256 Those courts have decided against the notice requirement
primarily on the basis of a literal reading of section 2-607(3)(a).25 7 The text of
the section requires that "the buyer" must give notice. Therefore, courts have
reasoned, it could not apply to a third party beneficiary because he is not a
buyer. Courts have reached this conclusion despite the fact that the text of sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a) does not specifically address the possibility that notice might be
required from third party beneficiaries. The text of section 2-607(3)(a) expressly
establishes notice requirements for buyers; it does not prohibit the possible re-
quirement of notice from third parties.
More disturbingly, these courts have exempted third party beneficiaries
from the need to give notice despite an extremely clear indication in comment 5
to section 2-607 that notice ought to be required. Comment 5 reads:
Under this Article various beneficiaries are given rights for inju-
ries sustained by them because of the seller's breach of warranty. Such
a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the present section in
regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice within a reason-
able time after acceptance, since he has nothing to do with acceptance.
However, the reason of this section does extend to requiring the benefi-
ciary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred. What is said
above, with regard to the extended time for reasonable notification
from the lay consumer after the injury is also applicable here; but even
a beneficiary can be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying,
once he has had time to become aware of the legal situation. 2 58
Comment 5 contemplates that the third party beneficiary is required to give no-
tice to a seller of the defective goods if the beneficiary intends to pursue a claim
based on the breach.
The intent of comment 5 is made even clearer by the indication of the nec-
essary adjustments to be made in the third party beneficiary context. The com-
ment indicates that the timing of notice for the third party beneficiary should be
256. See supra note 153.
257. See McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 1981) (construing Iowa law);
Snell v. G.D. Searle & Co., 595 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (dictum); Taylor v. American
Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d
509, 513 (Ala. 1979); Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire, 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 223, 217 A.2d 71, 73
(1965); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 620, 194 S.E.2d 513, 515
(1972); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 314, 363 A.2d 460, 465 (1976).
258. U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 5.
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adjusted and keyed to the discovery of breach through injury, rather than
through inspection upon acceptance of tender, because the third party benefici-
ary will not inspect upon tender. The comment also indicates that the third
party beneficiary should be viewed as liberally as the consumer buyer with re-
gard to the timing of notice; this allows additional time that may be necessary
for the nonbuyer to become aware of the facts relevant to his legal situation.
But ultimately, the comment embodies the proposition that good faith would
require a third party beneficiary to give reasonable notice to a seller he expects to
hold liable for damages resulting from an alleged breach.2 59
Despite the clear import of comment 5 to section 2-607, the courts that
have concluded third party beneficiaries should not be required to give notice
have either patently misused, ignored, or discredited comment 5. The misuse of
comment 5 began with the seminal case of Tomczuk v. Town of Cheshire.260
Tomczuk involved a child who was injured while playing on a bicycle during a
visit to another child's home.261 The bicycle had been purchased by the parents
of the child in whose home the injured party was a guest.2 6 2 The injured child
and her parents then brought suit as third party beneficiaries against the imme-
diate seller and the remote manufacturer. 263 The case thus involved both a re-
mote seller and a third party beneficiary. The remote manufacturer of the
bicycle defended against a claim for breach of warranty on the grounds that
plaintiffs had not alleged the giving of notice within a reasonable period of time.
The manufacturer asserted, by drawing on the logic of symmetry,264 that be-
cause the third parties were given the right of a buyer to bring suit against the
remote seller they should have the duty of a buyer to give the seller reasonable
notice.265
The Connecticut Superior Court in Tomczuk rejected the manufacturer's
argument for requiring notice, primarily on the basis that a literal reading of
section 2-607(3)(a) required notice from buyers only and to immediate sellers
only.266 The court also cited comment 5 to section 2-607 as supporting its deci-
sion. The court, however, quoted only the second sentence from comment 5 and
edited it to read: "Such a [third party] beneficiary does not fall within the rea-
son of ... [2-607(5)] in regard to discovery of defects and the giving of notice
259. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 11-10, at 424-25; Phillips, supra note 53, at
464; Note, supra note 190, at 531; see also W. HAWKLAND, supra note 12, § 2-607:06 (questioning
the decisions exempting third party beneficiaries from the notice requirement).
260. 26 Conn. Supp. 219, 217 A.2d 71 (1965).
261. Id. at 220, 217 A.2d at 72.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text.
265. The court recounted the remote manufacturer's argument:
[The manufacturer] further claims that since the plaintiffs seek to impose on it all the
duties imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code on sellers, it is only reasonable that (the
manufacturer] be given the notice rights of a seller, since the underlying theory of notice is
to give the defendant an opportunity to inspect allegedly defective goods so that he can
assess his liability.
Tomczuk, 26 Conn. Supp. at 220-21, 217 A.2d at 72.
266. Id. at 222, 217 A.2d at 73.
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within a reasonable time after acceptance, since he has nothing to do with ac-
ceptance." 267 The court thus took a limited portion of comment 5 concerning
the timing of notice coming from third party beneficiaries and distorted it to
deny application of the notice requirement. The Tomczuk court ignored the
two sentences immediately following, which make clear the third party benefici-
ary's obligation to give notice.
The Tomczuk court not only took the sentence out of context but also ed-
ited the sentence in a misleading manner. The Tomczuk court rewrote the sen-
tence to suggest that the remote seller is due notice only under the vouching-in
provisions of section 2-607(5), when in fact comment 5 has nothing to do with
the section 2-607(5) provisions concerning notice for vouching-in purposes. The
mistake in editing might conceivably be an honest mistake in determining the
interplay between section 2-607(3)(a) and section 2-607(5), especially in light of
the fact that the case was decided in 1965 shortly after the promulgation of the
Code.2 68 Patently taking a quoted sentence out of context, however, is not easily
explainable or excusable. Ironically, even the Tomczuk court admitted that re-
quiring notice from a third party beneficiary to a seller would be "more just or
equitable,"2 69 but it proceeded with a rigid, literal reading of section 2-607(3)(a)
and misuse of comment 5.
Subsequent courts have compounded the Tomczuk court's misreading of
comment 5 by following the decision without commenting upon the erroneous
and misleading editing.27 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit engaged in a similar misuse of comment 5 and relegated to a footnote a
curt acknowledgment that a portion of the comment states notice should be re-
quired from third party beneficiaries.2 7 1
267. Id. at 223, 217 A.2d at 74.
268. See generally M. BENFIELD & W. HAWKLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SALES 2-7 (2d
ed. 1987). The Code became effective in Connecticut on October 1, 1961. Id. at 7.
269. Tomczuk, 26 Conn. Supp. at 223, 217 A.2d at 73. The court stated:
Simply because the legislature created certain rights in a third party beneficiary as to
express or implied warranties, in adopting [§ 2-318], does not mean that by implication
such a beneficiary must give notice of an alleged breach to the manufacturer .... Even
though it might seem more just or equitable that such a beneficiary be required to give
notice in the same manner as a buyer, this court cannot legislate what [the remote seller]
seeks here.
Id. at 222-23, 217 A.2d at 73.
270. The courts favorably citing Tomczuk include McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101,
1107 (8th Cir. 1981); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 620, 194 S.E.2d
513, 515 (1972); Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 304, 314-15, 363 A.2d 460, 465-66
(1976); see also Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (not
citing Tomczuk, but citing cases that follow it). But see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6,
§ 11-10, at 424-25; Note, supra note 190, at 531-32 (criticizing the Tomczuk decision and stating
that comment 5 require notice from the third party beneficiary to the seller).
271. McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 n.9 (8th Cir. 1981) (construing Iowa law).
The McKnelly court stated:
By its terms, Section 2-607(3)(a) applies only to a buyer who has accepted tender of goods
from a seller. It does not expressly apply as between an injured third person other than the
buyer and a manufacturer instead of a seller. The official comments to the notice provision
state that a beneficiary does not fall within the reason of the section in regard to discovery
of defects and giving of notice within a reasonable time.
Id. at 1107 (citation omitted). The court then stated in the footnote:
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Even when squarely confronted with the import of comment 5 that notice
should be required from third party beneficiaries, courts have denied section 2-
607(3)(a) that effect. In Frericks v. General Motors Corp.272 the Maryland Court
of Appeals responded by devaluing the importance of the official comments to
the Uniform Commercial Code. The court stated in part:
[The defendant sellers] have also relied on ...Comment 5 to
section 2-607 in support of their contention that third party benefi-
ciaries are required to give notice of breach. While the official com-
ments are a valuable aid to construction, they have not been enacted by
the Legislature, and "[tihe plain language of the statute cannot be va-
ried by reference to the comments. '2 73
Although it is true that the comments are not legislative history in the sense
they do not reflect the deliberations of the state legislatures that adopted the
Code,274 the comments are entitled to interpretive weight because they reflect
the deliberations of the drafters of the Code.2 75 A general consensus exists
among scholars and courts that the comments are an important tool in constru-
ing the Code.276 Moreover, it is particularly striking that the courts have gener-
ally relied on the comments to section 2-607 in determining the proper
We have not overlooked that comment 5 to Section 2-607 also states that a beneficiary
might properly be held to the use of good faith in notifying the seller that an injury has
occurred once he becomes aware of the legal situation. We need not concern ourselves
with the nature or scope under Iowa law of this obligation of good faith notification, be-
cause we hold only that the Iowa Supreme Court, under the totality of the circumstances
would not apply the notice provision to [the plaintiff].
Id. at 1107 n.9. An almost identical mistreatment of comment 5 was given by the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F.
Supp. 59, 64 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
272. 278 Md. 304, 363 A.2d 460 (1976).
273. Id. at 312, 363 A.2d at 464 (quoting Wright v. Bank of Cal, Nat'l Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d
485, 490, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11, 14 (1969)).
274. See M. BENFIELD & W. HAWKLAND, supra note 268, at 12; J. HONNOLD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 12-14 (5th ed. 1984); R. NORDSTROM,
supra note 6, § 6.
275. See M. BENFIELD & W. HAWKLAND, supra note 268, at 12; Skilton, supra note 170, at 602-
03.
276. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 287-88 n.24 (Alaska 1976)
("Although Alaska's legislature did not enact the Official Comments as part of Title 45, and we do
not find them necessarily controlling in all instances in interpreting the Code, they are of persuasive
assistance in construction and application of the code." (citations omitted)); M. BENFIELD & W.
HAWKLAND, supra note 268, at 12 ("[The comments] were prepared with care, are closely inte-
grated with each section of the Code and constitute valuable aids to construction and, in particular,
uniform construction." (footnote omitted)); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 4 ("Besides
the text itself, the Official Comments appended to each section of the Official Text of the Code are by
far the most useful aids to interpretation and construction." (footnote omitted)). Another author
states:
There is a wealth of material in the Comments; that material was before the legislatures
when the Code was adopted; and that material should not be overlooked as a source of
Code construction. The Comments often explain why certain statutory language was cho-
sen, what policies were sought to be adopted or rejected, and how the section under consid-
eration harmonizes with other parts of the Code. This material is too valuable to be
ignored.
R. NORDSTROM, supra note 6, § 6 at 10 (footnote omitted); ef J. HONNOLD, supra note 274, at 12-
14 (cautioning against improper use of the comments).
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construction of the notice requirement in the privity context,2 77 but have fre-
quently resisted the clear dictate of comment 5 in determining the application of
section 2-607(3)(a) to third party beneficiaries.
A particularly important goal of the Uniform Commercial Code is to pro-
mote uniformity of the law. At the outset of the official text, the general com-
ment states that the purpose of the comments is to aid in obtaining a
"substantial uniformity of construction. '2 78 Despite the inclination of the
courts to follow the comments whenever possible,2 79 the comments properly
would be subject to disregard if they should contradict or prove inconsistent
with the official text of the Code.2 80 But such is not the case with comment 5.
Even though some courts have accepted the superficial view that a contradiction
exists by reasoning the section requires notice only from buyers and the com-
ment establishes a "contradictory" requirement of notice from third party bene-
ficiaries who are nonbuyers,28 ' more careful scrutiny leads to a different
conclusion.
Comment 5 does not contradict or narrow section 2-607(3)(a). It does not
exempt from the notice requirement persons expressly included by the text or
impose the requirement on persons expressly exempted from notice by the text.
Rather, comment 5 can be viewed as serving to refute the possibility that section
2-607(3)(a) carries a negative implication-the implication that by establishing a
notice requirement for buyers the section inferentially prohibits the requirement
of notice from nonbuyers. In this respect comment 5 to section 2-607 is similar
to comment 3 to section 2-318, which makes clear that by establishing third
party standing in certain cases, the section does preclude standing in additional
cases.282
Comment 5 suggests an application of the section to an additional, related
group of nonbuyers who might have standing under the Code to bring suit
against the seller. Importantly, this possibility of additional nonprivity parties
maintaining an action for breach of warranty was subject to some great variance
in the state law at the time of drafting of the Code.2 3 It is logical that the
277. For general citations to the use of the comments in construing the notice requirement, see
supra notes 56-137 and accompanying text, and cases cited in Dillsaver, supra note 56, at 221 n.5.
278. U.C.C. general comment.
279. See M. BENFIELD & W. HAWKLAND, supra note 268, at 12; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 6, § 4.
280. See J. HONNOLD, supra note 274, at 14 ("if the statutory provisions adopted by the legisla-
ture contradict or fail to support the Comments, the Comments must be rejected"); R. NORDSTROM,
supra note 6, § 6; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 4.
281. See Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59, 64 n.7 (M.D. Fla. 1982);
Frericks, 278 Md. at 312, 363 A.2d at 464.
282. See Skilton, supra note 170, at 617-21. After making a convincing argument that comment
3 to § 2-318 serves to refute a negative inference, Professor Skilton proceeds to raise the issue of
applying § 2-607(3)(a) to third party beneficiaries. Although he does not specifically offer a resolu-
tion, Professor Skilton hints that § 2-607(3)(a) should be read with a negative inference but puts
forth no clarifying or supporting analysis. Id. at 620-21.
283. The matter of the right of third party beneficiaries to sue, in light of the absence of privity,
was subject to great dispute. For instance, comment 3 to § 2-318 explained the reason for the 1966
change: "There appears to be no national consensus as to the scope of warranty protection which is
proper, but the promulgation of alternatives may prevent further proliferation of separate variations
in state after state." U.C.C. § 2-318 comment 3. The disparity in state law is also noted by the
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drafters of the Code might not have thought, or might have been hesistant, to
write into the text a requirement of notice for third party beneficiaries when the
law among the jurisdictions allowing standing to sue was subject to great
variance.
2. Consumer Naivete or Unwariness
Considering that a real conflict or contradiction between the text of section
2-607(3)(a) and comment 5 does not exist and that the official comments gener-
ally are given great weight by the courts, one is left to search for some convinc-
ing reason why the courts would not follow the comment in the case of third
party beneficiaries. One reason that courts might shy away from requiring no-
tice from. third party beneficiaries is because of the continued confusion of con-
tract actions with tort products liability actions, which do not require notice to
the seller. 284 A more prevalent reason for not following comment 5 to section 2-
607 is the view that it would be unfair to the consumer third party beneficiary to
require her to give notice to a party with whom she has not dealt because of
perceived "consumer naivete or unwariness." As discussed earlier, 285 the judi-
cial perception of consumer unwariness is very doubtful in its accuracy.
The judicial perception of "consumer unwariness" regarding third party
beneficiaries is based on several questionable presumptions. The perception
presumes that the third party beneficiary is unaware of the possibility of pursu-
ing a claim for an injury against some seller of the goods, that the third party
beneficiary is acting without the aid of legal counsel, and that the third party
beneficiary is without knowledge of the identity of the seller. The first two pre-
sumptions will almost certainly be wrong in the majority of cases. The con-
sumer third party beneficiary, like the remote vendee discussed above, is likely to
pursue a legal action against the seller with the aid of counsel, who is chargeable
with knowing the law. Even without the immediate aid of counsel, the prolifera-
tion of litigation against widely known remote manufacturers and sellers has
almost certainly resulted in a general public awareness of the possibility of law-
suit against those remote parties by consumers who suffer injury caused by de-
fective goods. Consequently, the third party beneficiary is very likely to be aware
of the possibility of pursuing an action against the seller or manufacturer of the
goods.
As to the presumption that the third party beneficiary will not know the
perambulatory suggestion that the section would be omitted altogether if ever made a part of federal
law. See also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REP. No.
2, at 39-40 (1964); PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REP.
No. 1, at 70 (1962) (citing controversy and lack of consensus on extension of warranty coverage to
third parties).
284. See McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1107 (8th Cir. 1981). The court stated:
"[Tlhere is authority that the better view, both under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uni-
form Sales Act, is that the notice provision is inapplicable to third parties, at least where personal
injuries rather than economic losses are sustained." Id. (citations omitted). For a more complete
discussion of the confusion of contract and tort causes of action, see supra notes 211-26 and accom-
panying text.
285. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
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identity of the sellers or manufacturers for the purpose of giving them notice,
courts should recognize that in a majority of cases the third party beneficiary
will not be a complete stranger to the transaction. The structure of section 2-318
reflects a likelihood the third party beneficiary will be a relative, friend or guest,
or employee of the purchaser.286 In the many cases in which the third party
beneficiary is a member of the buyer's family or holds a similar relationship, the
third party beneficiary undoubtedly would have access to the same information
the buyer would have in determining legal rights and potentially liable parties.
One could go so far as to say that the third party beneficiary generally will be as
able as the buyer to give notice but in many jurisdictions will be excused
nonetheless.
In the Maryland case of Mattos, Inc. v. Hash,28 7 for example, the employee-
third party beneficiary allegedly was the party who actually dealt with the seller
on behalf of his employer, and was nearly equivalent to being a buyer.2 88 The
defendant seller, therefore, argued that requiring notice from the third party
beneficiary in this case would not have been any less reasonable than a require-
ment of notice from the employer-buyer. 2 89 The court's rather terse response
was that the relevant Code sections simply do not require notice from a third
party beneficiary. The court did not address the fairness of imposing such a
requirement. 290
The relationship between the third party beneficiary and buyer in the Mat-
tos case is typical. The facts in the leading cases applying section 2-607(3)(a) to
third party beneficiaries overwhelmingly support the conclusion that the third
party beneficiary will very probably have a relationship with the buyer that will
permit access to information about the sales transaction.291 Even in the case in
286. For the text of § 2-318, see supra note 140. The most popular version of § 2-318 gives
standing to family members or guests of the buyer; the two other versions extend warranty coverage
to natural persons or any person who might reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-318; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 11-3, at 402-05. The
alternative versions of the section generally contemplate some tie between the seller and the third
person affected by the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-318.
287. 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993 (1977).
288. Id. at 377, 368 A.2d at 996.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 377, 368 A.2d at 996-97. In Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs., Inc., 787 F.2d 1468,
1474 (1 1th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff sought to avoid the notice requirement in a breach of warranty
action on the grounds that he was a third party beneficiary and not the purchaser of the goods. The
plaintiff alleged that at the time of purchase "his father went with him and paid for the motorcycle"
involved in the case with the understanding that the plaintiff would repay his father. Under Ala-
bama law, if plaintiff succeeded in proving that he was not "the buyer," he would have no obligation
to give notice despite his intimate involvement in the transaction. Id. at 1474 (citing Simmons v.
Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 513 (Ala. 1979)).
291. The nexus between the third party beneficiary and the buyer is obvious in the leading cases.
See McKnelly v. Sperry Corp., 642 F.2d 1101, 1103 (1981) (third party beneficiary was employee);
Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala. 1979) (third party beneficiaries were employ-
ees and their spouses); Tomczuk, 26 Conn. Supp. at 220, 217 A.2d at 72 (third party beneficiary was
guest in home); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 127 Ga. App. 619, 619, 194 S.E.2d 513,
515 (1972) (third party beneficiary was family member); Frericks, 278 Md. at 306, 363 A.2d at 461
(third party -beneficiary was guest in automobile). A rare case presenting the possibility of a third
party without access to the buyer is Taylor v. American Honda Motor Co., 555 F. Supp. 59 (M.D.
Fla. 1982), in which the injured party was in possession of an allegedly defective motorcycle, but
there was little evidence as to how he had acquired it. Id. at 63. If one speculates that it was the gift
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which the third party beneficiary is a stranger, it can be argued that he should be
chargeable with investigating what sellers or other parties may be responsible for
a defective product causing the injury. The beneficiary will have to do so for the
purpose of identifying the parties against whom he might bring a lawsuit, if not
for the purpose of giving notice of breach.
The one legitimate concern in this area for the third party beneficiary is that
it may take longer in some cases to gather information or realize the possibility
of recovering against the remote seller. To the extent a third party beneficiary
may truly suffer from a lack of information about the buyer, seller, and sales
transaction, comment 5 to section 2-607 addresses that concern by allowing the
third party beneficiary the benefit of a liberal time in which to give notice to a
seller.2 92 The time allowed the third party beneficiary would presumably in-
clude time to become apprised of the legal situation, to investigate the origin of
the defective goods, and to acquire the assistance of legal counsel. However, the
third party beneficiary-like a merchant or consumer buyer-should not be able
to delay notice to the disadvantage of the seller without reason. A liberal con-
struction of the period for giving notice would sufficiently protect the third party
beneficiary without absolutely depriving the seller of the basic right to receive
reasonably prompt notice.
3. Legislative Intent
The courts that have disregarded comment 5 to section 2-607 and decided
that notice should not be required from third party beneficiaries have often
raised the issue of legislative intent to further buttress their construction of sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a).2 93 These courts have reasoned that if the legislatures had in-
tended to extend the requirement of notice of breach in accepted goods to third
party beneficiaries, then they would have done so expressly when they adopted
section 2-318 giving third party beneficiaries the right to sue for breach of war-
ranty.294 These courts reason that because the legislatures did not amend sec-
tion 2-607(3)(a) to apply explicitly to third party beneficiaries, the legislatures
must have intended not to require notice from third party beneficiaries.
In light of the general paucity of legislative history on the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code or Article 2,295 it is difficult to obtain an accurate
indication of legislative intent. In fact, the courts that work along this path do
of a donor with whom the third party no longer had contact, then perhaps the identity of some
sellers in the distributive chain would be made difficult. But even in this case the injured party
certainly had no difficulty identifying American Honda as a possible party defendant, because the
motorcycle carried the brand name. See id.
292. According to comment 5 of § 2-607, "What is said above, with regard to the extended time
for reasonable notification from the lay consumer after the injury is also applicable here .... "
U.C.C. § 2-607 comment 5.
293. See Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979); Tonczuk, 26 Conn. Supp.
at 223, 217 A.2d at 73; Frericks, 278 Md. at 314-16, 363 A.2d at 465-66.
294. See, e.g., Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 514 (Ala. 1979) ("If the legislature
intended to require warranty beneficiaries to give notice, then it is presumed the legislature would
have included such a provision particularly in light of the other specific amendments [defining war-
ranty liability for personal injury].").
295. Legislative history in individual states frequently is not available. When it is, the history
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so only in the very sparse light that comes from the text of the Code sections as
adopted.2 96 Divining legislative intent on the application of section 2-607(3)(a)
from the form of section 2-318 adopted is a very uncertain process. In Can-
non 297 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals acknowledged the dubiousness of
the approach, but pursued it nonetheless. The Maryland legislature had adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code, including section 2-607, in 1964 but subse-
quently eliminated the requirement of privity in actions for breach of warranty
in 1969.298 The majority opinion observed that the action of the legislature in
failing to expand the application of section 2-607(3)(a) while giving additional
parties the right to pursue breach of warranty actions could raise three alterna-
tive inferences: (1) aware that the notice requirement applied only to buyer and
immediate seller, the legislature intended no change; (2) aware of the statutory
language, the legislature assumed that section 2-607(3)(a) would automatically
be expanded to cover nonprivity consumers; or (3) the most likely alternative, it
never thought about the problem.2 99
Little evidence is available to dispute the Cannon court's conclusion that
the legislature probably did not consider the issues that were collateral to the
expansion of warranty coverage to third party beneficiaries. To read the failure
of a legislature to speak to an issue as an indication a rule of law was considered
and rejected is unsound. 3°° It would be reasonable to assume, however, that the
legislature was more concerned with defining the class of persons to be given the
benefit of warranty coverage under section 2-318 than addressing the peripheral,
albeit important, issues raised by such extension. Justice Lowe concurred in the
Cannon decision but disagreed with the majority's reasoning. The concurring
opinion stated in part:
I do not agree with the moral rationale that either justice or "fair
play" supports [a finding of legislative intent not to require notice to
nonprivity sellers], nor can I imagine with the majority that the Legis-
lature could have been aware of the problem and desired to make no
change. In a society surviving on mass production, the removal of the
privity shield exposed the financial stability of manufacturers by creat-
ing an entire, new vista of suits by plaintiffs and a fruitful field for spe-
cialization in the legal professions. To think that the Legislature
usually reflects only the nonuniform amendments. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6,
introduction § 4, at 12.
296. None of the courts that use legislative intent to support the argument that the notice re-
quirement should not be applied to third party beneficiaries offer citation to any actual legislative
history. Cf. Cannon, 53 Md. App. at 119-20, 452 A.2d at 199 (Lowe, J., concurring) (using limited
documentary history to support argument that legislative intent was uncertain at best).
297. See supra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
298. Cannon, 53 Md. App. at 118, 452 A.2d at 198.
299. Id. The Cannon court was immediately concerned with a remote vendee, id., but the sec-
tions cited and the reasoning applies equally to the third party beneficiary context.
300. "Legislative inaction is a weak reed upon which to lean in determining legislative intent."
Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 311, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966). See generally Alabama-Tennessee
Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 359 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Legislative silence
is a Delphic divination"); H. Miles Foy III, Some Reflections On Legislation, Adjudication And hn-
plied Private Actions In The State And Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 521-22 (1986)
(noting problems with the argument that legislative silence can be an indication of legislative intent).
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would consciously effect such a revolutionary change and intentionally
deprive fair warning, even to the exposed giants that a crippling blow
may be struck, is insulting to the General Assembly. It is one thing to
accuse it of lack of knowledge, forgivable in an era when it was begin-
ning to emerge from an antiquated system. It is quite another to
charge it with invoking procedural unfairness.
Procedural fair play, like procedural due process, must be equally
provided not only to the poor or individual consumers but to the rich,
and to the corporate goliaths as well .... We have made manufactur-
ers "equally" vulnerable by abolishing privity. They should be equally
equipped to defend themselves fairly by reasonable forewarning. 30'
Justice Lowe's emphatic comments go beyond the circumstances of the case at
hand to the more general and essential point that attributing legislative intent
because of a failure to expressly address a question is more unreasonable than
simply acknowledging the legislative oversight and then supplying a reasonable
construction of the statute.
The Massachusetts legislature is one which has spoken directly to the issue.
The legislators amended the adopted version of section 2-318 to provide specifi-
cally that notice from nonprivity parties was not required absent demonstrable
prejudice to the seller being sued. 302 The Massachusetts Appeals Court has
observed: "[The Massachusetts version of] section 2-318 is explicit that the bur-
den is on the [seller] to prove prejudice in cases .. in which there was no notice
of any breach of warranty prior to the commencement of the action. '30 3
Other than Massachusetts, the only states to address the question to some
degree are Maine and South Carolina. The law in those two states effectively
pre-empts the application of section 2-607(3)(a) in cases involving consumer per-
sonal injury.3° 4 The actions of these two states reflect a principal concern with a
category of injury.30 5 The modifications to the notice requirement do not distin-
guish between those parties with privity and those not in privity.
Noting the action of the Massachusetts legislature as the only state action
that has specifically addressed the requirement of notice in nonprivity cases, one
important observation and two conclusions can be drawn. The observation is
that Massachusetts has not adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
301. Id. at 120-23, 452 A.2d at 200-01 (Lowe, J., concurring). Justice Lowe stated that he sepa-
rately concurred for two reasons: "First to point out to the Legislature its obvious oversight in 1969
and secondly to remind the Court of Appeals ... [that] it is constitutionally endowed with the
authority to regulate the procedure of the judicial process to ensure fair play." Id. at 122, 452 A.2d
at 200 (citations omitted).
302. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318 (Law. Co-op. 1984); see supra note 243; Henricks v.
Coats Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 976, 458 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1984); Cameo Curtains, Inc. v. Philip Carey
Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 427, 416 N.E.2d 995, 998 (1981).
303. Henricks v. Coats Co., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 976, 458 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1984).
304. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1I, § 2-607 (1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607 (Law. Co-
op. 1976); supra note 242 and accompanying text.
305. The Maine statute exempts application of § 2-607(3)(a) to "personal injury" cases, see ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-607(7) (1973), and the South Carolina statute exempts "notice of injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods," S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-607(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
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of Torts, which defines strict products liability. 30 6 Instead, the warranty provi-
sions of Article 2 have been structured to cover personal injury cases. 30 7 In this
respect Massachusetts law is rather unusual and provides only limited insight
into the likely contemplations of legislative bodies in other states. Most other
states have adopted some form of strict products liability in tort30 8 in addition
and as an alternative to Article 2 and section 2-318.309
Nonetheless, one can draw at least two conclusions based on the Massachu-
setts legislative conduct. First, the action taken by the Massachusetts legislature
suggests that it perceived a need to act in an explicit manner to exempt nonpriv-
ity parties from the notice requirement. One could infer that in the absence of
language speaking to the issue, the legislature believed that the statute and com-
ments required notice. Based on this inference, if other legislatures had intended
to exempt third party beneficiaries from the notice requirement, then they
should have spoken up as the Massachusetts legislature did.
The second point to note about the Massachusetts legislation is that it does
not completely exempt nonprivity parties, including third party beneficiaries,
from the application of section 2-607(3)(a). Rather, third party beneficiaries are
exempted from giving notice only when the failure to do so does not result in
demonstrable prejudice to the seller. Needless to say, the prudent third party
beneficiary will always want to provide reasonable notice rather than risk the
possibility that the failure to do so might result in provable prejudice to the
seller.
Ultimately, the Massachusetts statute means that although the seller will
have the burden of proof on the issue of prejudice, he will have the benefit of the
section 2-607(3)(a) requirement of notice of breach in accepted goods even in
third party beneficiary cases. If the failure of the third party beneficiary to give
notice results in prejudice to the seller, as determined by reference to the pur-
poses of section 2-607(3)(a), 3 10 then the third party beneficiary will be barred
from any remedy under Article 2. The Massachusetts legislation changes the
mechanics and burden of proof, but effectively preserves the essence of section 2-
607(3)(a): the seller will have the benefit of reasonable notice and will be pro-
tected from the harm flowing from a lack of notice of alleged breach. For the
many other states that have not spoken directly to the issue, it would be too
306. Swartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 630-31, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (1978).
307. Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 412, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (1984); Swartz v. General
Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 630, 378 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (1978). The Massachusetts courts view the
action for breach of warranty as sounding essentially in tort. Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 388 Mass. 342, 353, 446 N.E.2d 103, 1039 (1983).
308. The count of states having adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts or a simi-
lar rule numbers more than 40. See V. COUNTRYMAN, A. KAUFMAN & Z. WISEMAN, COMMER-
CIAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1030 (2d ed. 1982); Gaebler, supra note 217, at 594 n.5.
309. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 141, § 2-318:6.
310. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. Massachusetts law-before the amendments
to § 2-318 affected § 2-607(3)(a)---required consideration of the purposes in determining the ade-
quacy of notice. See Nugent v. Popular Mkts., Inc., 353 Mass. 45, 48-50, 228 N.E.2d 91, 93-94
(1967); Ford v. Barnard, Sumner & Putnam Co., 1 Mass. App. Ct. 192, 194, 294 N.E.2d 467, 468
(1973). It follows that the purposes would be considered in determining the existence of prejudice
from the lack of reasonable notice.
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presumptuous to read into the legislative inaction an intent to rob the seller of
his fundamental right to reasonable notice.
CONCLUSION
The prospect of a seller becoming liable to a remote vendee or third party
beneficiary for breach of contract has increased significantly through the wide-
spread elimination of the requirement of privity to maintain an action for breach
of contract. Although it is fundamentally sound that liability for injuries caused
by defective goods should be placed on the seller, it is equally basic that the
seller ought to have an adequate opportunity to defend and to minimize dam-
ages the defective goods may have caused. The requirement of notice of breach
in accepted goods is intended to preserve these basic rights to the seller.
To the extent that legislatures and courts have found it appropriate to in-
crease the number of parties to whom the manufacturer or seller may be liable,
justice requires the seller at least to benefit from the normal defenses that can be
fairly and reasonably applied in the nonprivity contexts. The section 2-607(3)(a)
requirement of notice of breach in accepted goods is one defensive rule feasibly
applicable to both the remote vendee and the third party beneficiary. Further-
more, the notice requirement serves legitimate purposes as effectively in nonpriv-
ity cases as in privity cases. The arguments against applying the notice
requirement prove terribly flawed on close scrutiny.
Several judges have observed that the consumer now has the clear advan-
tage in actions against sellers and manufacturers for injury in goods that prove
defective. It is up to the courts, however, to impose two important limitations:
the consumer advantage should not swing so far as to become unfair and, more
specifically, an action brought under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
should satisfy all the relevant requirements of the Code, not just selected
provisions.
The concern of the courts for the consumer is well placed as long as it is
reflected in a willingness to construe liberally the requirements of section 2-
607(3)(a). The proper measure of liberality should allow the consumer both a
generous period of time in which to give notice and a flexible standard for the
sufficiency of notice, which should include the allowance of the timely initiation
of a lawsuit to suffice as notice. Consumer interests, however, are overprotected
when courts completely eliminate the requirement of notice of breach in ac-
cepted goods. Courts should not lose sight of the basic section 2-607(3)(a) objec-
tive of balancing the interests of the buyer or third party beneficiary in pursuing
an action for breach in accepted goods of the seller with the interest having
protection from the harm that would result if he closed the books on a transac-
tion only to find it to be the subject of a lawsuit a long time thereafter. A liberal
but proper construction of section 2-607(3)(a) will prevent it from becoming an
overly technical "booby trap for the unwary consumer," but will protect against
prejudice to the seller by ensuring notice of an alleged breach within a reason-
able time after its discovery by either privity or nonprivity consumers.
A simple review of recent court decisions on these issues leads to the expec-
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tation that courts will continue to exempt nonprivity parties from notice require-
ments, especially third party beneficiaries. The courts should, however, be
receptive to arguments that underscore the inequality in exempting the notice
requirement, as well as the lack of statutory foundation for the position.
In the absence of a correction within the courts on this issue, the legisla-
tures should address specifically the question of notice and nonprivity parties.
In addressing such questions, the legislatures should be reminded of the distinc-
tion between tort and contract causes of action. Recognizing the interests of all
parties and the policies underlying the section 2-607(3)(a) notice rule, the legisla-
tures should address directly the question whether good reason exists to excuse
consumers from notifying a remote seller that a lawsuit for breach of contract
may be forthcoming.

